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 ASSUMPTION OF FLOOD RISK 
Alexander B. Lemann* 
2017 was the costliest year for flood damage in American history. 
Somewhat fortuitously, the beleaguered National Flood Insurance Program 
came up for reauthorization just as the country was bearing the brunt of 
Hurricanes Harvey, Irma, and Maria. With the program at its borrowing 
limit and facing the prospect of being unable to pay claims, Congress punted 
on the question of long-term reform by forgiving its past debt and extending 
its reauthorization deadline. That deadline has since been extended seven 
more times, with little substantive discussion of the widely-felt need for 
reform. 
Scientists expect a warmer climate to cause more intense rainfall, more 
powerful hurricanes, and higher sea levels, all of which will significantly 
worsen the flood risk we face. Meanwhile, many see federal policy as failing 
to encourage sustainable development. Indeed, the dominant view of experts 
is that programs like the National Flood Insurance Program (“NFIP”) have 
made the problem worse, by insulating property owners from the effects of 
storms and thus artificially inflating the value of flood-prone real estate. This 
viewpoint, however, assumes that the purpose of federal policy in this area 
should be to incentivize some objectively optimal level of exposure to the risk 
of floods. The behavior of policymakers, on the other hand, strongly suggests 
that this utilitarian approach to the problem is not the only—or even the 
default—way of thinking about our exposure to risk. 
Drawing on tort doctrine, and particularly the defense of assumption of 
risk, I argue that there is instead a set of deeply moral instincts underlying 
our response to flood risk. The doctrine of assumption of risk assigns 
responsibility for the realization of risks not when our decisions to confront 
them are objectively rational, but rather when they are made freely, with 
meaningful knowledge of the risk and a choice of whether to accept it. These 
ideas, I argue, can already be detected in the rate structure of the NFIP, and 
yet they are largely ignored in the broader policy debate about how best to 
share the burden of flood risk. If tort law represents a distillation and 
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application of our common moral intuitions about risk and responsibility, it 
can shed light on how this complex problem should be resolved. 
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INTRODUCTION 
After spending four days dumping an unprecedented quantity of water on 
the Houston area, Hurricane Harvey finally slid off the coast to the south, 
leaving the city to begin the gradual process of wringing itself out and 
evaluating the damage.1 Major storms are often treated as showing us 
something we should have known all along. For many, Hurricane Harvey’s 
lesson was that the era of climate change—the Anthropocene—is well under 
way. By the time Harvey reached Houston it was no longer a particularly 
powerful storm, by the traditional measure of sustained wind speed.2 But, 
thanks to the fact that warmer air can hold more moisture, the quantity of 
water it dropped was truly immense.3 Multiple rainfall gauges in Houston 
recorded quantities of water that exceeded previous records in the continental 
United States by 26%.4 
Another story told about Harvey was a cautionary tale. Houston, low-lying 
and laced with bayous, has always been flood-prone. But a quick series of 
bad floods within the past three years suggested a worsening problem. To 
many, the storms were illustrations of the perils of the unchecked 
development for which Houston is famous.5 By paving over so much of the 
open prairie that once surrounded it, Houston had given the water nowhere 
                                                                                                                                            
 1. ERIC S. BLAKE & DAVID A. ZELINSKY, NAT’L HURRICANE CTR., TROPICAL CYCLONE 
REPORT: HURRICANE HARVEY 1, 56 (2018), https://www.nhc.noaa.gov/data/tcr/AL092017_
Harvey.pdf [https://perma.cc/U94T-DLWM]. 
 2. Id. 
 3. Technically, scientists are able to say not that climate change caused Harvey itself but 
rather that it dramatically increases the chance of a Harvey-like event occurring. See Mark D. 
Risser & Michael F. Wehner, Attributable Human-Induced Changes in the Likelihood and 
Magnitude of the Observed Extreme Precipitation During Hurricane Harvey, 44 GEOPHYSICAL 
RES. LETTERS 12,457, 12,457 (2017) (finding that “human-induced climate change likely 
increased the chances of the observed precipitation accumulations during Hurricane 
Harvey . . . by a factor of at least 3.5”). Another factor thought to be linked to climate change is 
the way Harvey “stalled” near Houston. Weather patterns at the time had pushed the jet stream to 
the north, a condition that is associated with climate change. Michael E. Mann, It’s a Fact: 
Climate Change Made Hurricane Harvey More Deadly, GUARDIAN (Aug. 28, 2017, 10:07 AM), 
https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2017/aug/28/climate-change-hurricane-harvey-
more-deadly[https://perma.cc/C2QF-X7JR]. 
 4. BLAKE & ZELINSKY, supra note 1, at 6. 
 5. See, e.g., Manny Fernandez & Richard Fausset, A Storm Forces Houston, the Limitless 
City, To Consider Its Limits, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 30, 2017), https://nyti.ms/2wpnVPq 
[https://perma.cc/BRQ2-3J42] (noting that “developers’ encroachment into the wetlands and 
prairies that used to serve Houston as natural sponges has inevitably exacerbated the misery that 
the city is suffering today”). The amount of impervious surface in Harris County increased by 
25% between 1996 and 2011. Neena Satija, Kiah Collier & Al Shaw, Boomtown, Flood Town, 
PROPUBLICA (Dec. 7, 2016), https://projects.propublica.org/houston-cypress/ 
[https://perma.cc/D5P2-KDTV]. 
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else to go. Where once it might have soaked into marshy grasslands, it now 
slid across impermeable barriers of asphalt and concrete, filling bayous and 
reservoirs well past capacity.6 
As an illustration of this hubris there was no better example than Canyon 
Gate, a neighborhood that was constructed entirely within one of Houston’s 
two enormous flood control reservoirs. In a series of feature articles entitled 
Built to Flood, the New York Times profiled Canyon Gate, telling the story of 
its construction and destruction and the people who call it home.7 How could 
anyone be so foolish, the articles seem to ask, as to build a house inside a 
flood control reservoir? Canyon Gate might be the poster child for an 
argument that is frequently heard in the current debate over how to manage 
our ever-increasing flood risk. That argument holds that many of the people 
flooded in events like Hurricane Harvey knew the risks to which they were 
exposing themselves and thus deserve little of our sympathy or, perhaps more 
to the point, our money.8 
As climate change causes rising sea levels, more intense hurricanes, and 
heavier rainfall all over America, the systems by which we allocate and 
redistribute the costs of flooding are being placed under increasing strain. The 
National Flood Insurance Program (“NFIP”), in particular, has come to be 
seen as the leading indication that our approach to the problem is “broken.”9 
                                                                                                                                            
 6. See, e.g., Samuel D. Brody et al., Identifying the Impact of the Built Environment on 
Flood Damage in Texas, 32 DISASTERS 1, 1 (2008) (analyzing factors contributing to flood 
damage and finding that “naturally occurring wetlands play a particularly important role in 
mitigating flood damage”). 
 7. Tim Wallace et al., How One Houston Suburb Ended Up in a Reservoir, N.Y. TIMES 
(Mar. 22, 2018), https://nyti.ms/2FWQ9Ji [https://perma.cc/8LPA-VP5X]. 
 8. See ERIC RAKOWSKI, EQUAL JUSTICE 79 (1991) (“If a citizen of a large and 
geographically diverse nation like the United States builds his home in a flood plain, or near the 
San Andreas fault, or in the heart of tornado country, then the risk of flood, earthquake, or 
crushing winds is one he chooses to bear, since those risks could be all but eliminated by living 
elsewhere.”); Greg Hanscom, Dreading Water: Should Coastal Communities Bear the Cost of 
Future Floods?, GRIST (Feb. 5, 2014), https://grist.org/politics/dreading-water-should-coastal-
communities-bear-the-cost-of-future-floods-2/ [https://perma.cc/JQE5-Q7U8] (“If you choose to 
live in a place that is vulnerable to storm surges or floods, you will have to take that risk upon 
yourselves.”); Editorial, Hold Strong on Flood Insurance, WASH. POST (Feb. 2, 2014), 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/hold-strong-on-flood-insurance/2014/02/02/
5305ac62-8ab5-11e3-833c-33098f9e5267_story.html [https://perma.cc/CX2K-ZFYR] (“[I]t 
takes some chutzpah for NFIP beneficiaries to act entitled to subsidies from the vast majority of 
taxpayers who chose not to live on the beach . . . .”); Judith Kildow & Jason Scorse, End Federal 
Flood Insurance, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 28, 2012), https://nyti.ms/2wc09rm [https://perma.cc/F6DD-
TP6E] (“If they choose to live in harm’s way, they should bear the cost of that risk — not the 
taxpayers.”) . 
 9. Mary Williams Walsh, A Broke, and Broken, Flood Insurance Program, N.Y. TIMES 
(Nov. 4, 2017), https://nyti.ms/2hEsXBi [https://perma.cc/6UJE-RHX7]. 
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Because the NFIP has been in debt to the Treasury since Hurricane Katrina 
in 2005, it is often described as providing a subsidy to its flood-prone policy 
holders in the form of artificially cheap insurance premiums.10 By the time 
the 2017 hurricane season had wound down, the NFIP’s debt to the Treasury 
was rapidly approaching its statutory limit of $30.4 billion.11 With the entire 
program set to expire unless reauthorized by Congress in September, the time 
seemed ripe for wholesale reform.12 
In both the popular press and the academic literature, there is near-
universal agreement that reform of the NFIP should be focused on 
eliminating subsidized rates entirely, so that all policyholders pay rates that 
reflect the full measure of the risk they face individually, known as 
“actuarial” rates.13 One striking feature of this call for reform is how it differs 
                                                                                                                                            
 10. See, e.g., Ike Brannon & Ari Blask, The Government’s Hidden Housing Subsidy for the 
Rich, POLITICO (Aug. 8, 2017), https://www.politico.com/agenda/story/2017/08/08/hidden-
subsidy-rich-flood-insurance-000495. 
 11. Diane P. Horn, National Flood Insurance Program Borrowing Authority, FED’N AM. 
SCIENTISTS (Sep. 10, 2018), https://fas.org/sgp/crs/homesec/IN10784.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/S3FX-LAAE]. 
 12. Walsh, supra note 9 (noting calls for reform from an “unusual coalition of insurers, 
environmentalists, and fiscal conservatives”). As the NFIP was approaching its borrowing limit 
in the early Fall of 2017, Mick Mulvaney, director of the Office of Management and Budget, sent 
a letter to Vice President Mike Pence and congressional leaders urging Congress to forgive $16 
billion of the NFIP’s debt to cover expected claims from that season’s hurricanes while also 
passing a package of long-term reforms. Letter from Mick Mulvaney to Michael Pence (Oct. 4, 
2017), https://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/whitehouse.gov/files/omb/Letters/Letter%20
regarding%20additional%20funding%20and%20reforms%20to%20address%20impacts%20of
%20recent%20natural%20disasters.pdf [https://perma.cc/9KWT-RYHR]. The debt forgiveness 
was passed, but Congress has not yet acted on various proposed reforms. 
 13. See U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-17-425, FLOOD INSURANCE: 
COMPREHENSIVE REFORM COULD IMPROVE SOLVENCY AND ENHANCE RESILIENCE (2017), 
https://www.gao.gov/assets/690/684354.pdf [https://perma.cc/SC34-ATZ8]; Omri Ben-Shahar & 
Kyle D. Logue, The Perverse Effects of Subsidized Weather Insurance, 68 STAN. L. REV. 571, 
571 (2016) (arguing that “existing government subsidies induce excessive development (and 
redevelopment) of storm-stricken and erosion-prone areas”); Robin Kundis Craig, Harvey, Irma, 
and the NFIP: Did the 2017 Hurricane Season Matter to Flood Insurance Reauthorization?, U. 
ARK. LITTLE ROCK L. REV. (forthcoming 2018); Chad J. McGuire, Examining Legal and 
Regulatory Barriers to Climate Change Adaptation in the Coastal Zone of the United States, 4 
COGENT ENVTL. SCI. 1, 9 (2018) (“[T]he inherent subsidies created in national flood insurance 
and disaster relief must be removed so the public can properly gauge coastal risk.”); Editorial, 
Hold Strong on Flood Insurance, supra note 8; Editorial, How Federal Flood Insurance Puts 
Homes at Risk, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 31, 2017), https://nyti.ms/2xBwGpL [https://perma.cc/V5P8-
TB9N] (“The biggest change would be to have premiums reflect the actual overall risk.”). I took 
this position myself in my early writing on this topic. Alexander Lemann, Rolling Back the Tide: 
Toward an Individual Mandate for Flood Insurance, 26 FORDHAM ENVTL L. REV. 166, 210 
(2015). There are notable exceptions to this consensus view. Robert Verchick and Lynsey 
Johnson, for example, are careful to note the harsh effects a wholesale adoption of actuarial rates 
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from the way we manage many other forms of risk.14 Another is that it has 
been tried before. In 2012, Congress passed the Biggert-Waters Flood 
Control Act, which eliminated virtually all categories of subsidized 
premiums.15 Twenty months later, facing a groundswell of opposition, 
Biggert-Waters was largely repealed.16 Despite being treated as the obviously 
wise policy solution to the problem of flood risk by experts from across the 
political spectrum, actuarial rates have proved to be elusive. 
The call for actuarial rates is usually based on two related ideas. First, by 
eliminating too-cheap subsidized rates, the NFIP would presumably collect 
more in premiums, helping offset its losses in years with major floods and 
making it possible for the program to work off its debt.17 Second, by charging 
rates that reflect the full magnitude of the risk homeowners are facing, the 
NFIP can provide a meaningful signal of that risk, incentivizing efficient 
levels of precaution.18 The instinct underlying this latter argument is that 
people choose where to live with some knowledge of the flood risk they face 
and, if that risk changes, they can choose to leave. This instinct is sometimes 
translated into a moral claim, that flood risk should not be socialized because 
it is a risk people assume, like the risk of smoking and unlike the risk of being 
old. The quick demise of Biggert-Waters suggests that this assumption of risk 
instinct deserves more attention. In the policy discussion swirling around 
                                                                                                                                            
would have. See Robert R.M. Verchick & Lynsey R. Johnson, When Retreat Is the Best Option: 
Flood Insurance After Biggert-Waters and Other Climate Change Puzzles, 47 J. MARSHALL L. 
REV. 695, 715–16 (2014) (noting that “cutting subsidies” “could lead to sudden instability in local 
housing markets and push financially strapped owners out of the insurance market altogether, 
increasing their vulnerability”); see also Adam F. Scales, A Nation of Policyholders: 
Governmental and Market Failure in Flood Insurance, 26 MISS. C. L. REV. 3, 44–45 (2006) 
(noting that “[e]liminating the grandfathering provisions overnight would cause a collapse in 
home values” and proposing instead that subsidies be phased out over a 15 year period). 
 14. See infra Part II.A. 
 15. Biggert-Waters Flood Ins. Reform Act of 2012, Pub. L. No. 112-141, Title II, § 100205, 
126 Stat. 916. 
 16. See Homeowner Flood Insurance Affordability Act of 2014, Pub. L. No. 113-89, 128 
Stat. 1020. 
 17. See, e.g., U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, supra note 13, at 2 (“Eliminating rate 
subsidies by requiring all rates to reflect the full risk of loss would address an underlying cause 
of NFIP’s debt and minimize federal fiscal exposure.”). 
 18. See, e.g., Ben-Shahar & Logue, supra note 13, at 571 (arguing that “existing government 
subsidies induce excessive development (and redevelopment) of storm-stricken and erosion-
prone areas”); Scales, supra note 13, at 44 (“Something approaching the market rate is absolutely 
essential to signal to consumers that lakeshore views are expensive.”); Michael Faure & Qihao 
He, Private Law and Climate Disasters: Insurance Law, in RESEARCH HANDBOOK ON CLIMATE 
DISASTER LAW: BARRIERS AND OPPORTUNITIES 348, 357 (Rosemary Lyster & Robert R.M. 
Verchick eds., 2018); Craig, supra note 13. 
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flood insurance, these deeper questions—whether and to what degree we 
want to socialize the cost of floods, and if so how—are rarely asked. 
This Article makes several contributions to this debate. First, it 
foregrounds the primarily moral questions lurking behind proposals to reform 
the NFIP and begins to address them explicitly. The assumption of risk 
instinct is a common one: there is a sense that people who choose to take on 
a risk should be responsible for its realization, while those who are exposed 
to a risk unknowingly or involuntarily deserve our aid. But, I argue, it is often 
wrong to say that people living in flood-prone properties knew the risk they 
faced ex ante and chose to accept it. Drawing on tort law’s articulation of this 
moral concept—the doctrine of assumption of risk—I argue that this view is 
troublingly simplistic.19 In fact, many people do not understand the flood risk 
they face in any meaningful sense, and many people do not have a range of 
choices when deciding where to live. 
Canyon Gate is a perfect example. Although the entire subdivision is built 
within the maximum “flood pool” of the Barker Reservoir, the reservoir itself 
is normally dry. When it’s not flooded, it contains a large park, complete with 
soccer and baseball fields, horse riding trails, a dog park, and—this being 
Texas—a shooting range.20 When the federal government completed 
                                                                                                                                            
 19. My argument is not that this area is governed by tort law in any positivist sense, but 
rather that tort doctrines reflect a distillation and application of our shared moral intuitions and 
thus can shed light on how this problem should (for both normative and practical reasons) be 
resolved. Cf. Daniel Schwarcz, A Products Liability Theory for the Judicial Regulation of 
Insurance Policies, 48 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1389 (2007) (drawing on products liability law as a 
framework for regulating insurance policies). In a methodological sense, this project helps fill a 
gap in the literature on disaster law and climate change adaptation, which is largely utilitarian in 
its approach. Just as it is now commonplace for theorists to recognize two dominant views of tort 
law—a wealth-maximization or efficiency view and a moral or deontological view—I believe 
disaster law is susceptible to both modes of analysis. The question most often asked of law in the 
context of natural disasters is how it can best be used to nudge us towards some optimal level of 
investment in risk mitigation, but disaster law also benefits from philosophical analysis, which 
helps shed light on behaviors that appear irrational and unjustifiable from a purely economic 
perspective. In this sense I see this project as building on a limited body of work that approaches 
these problems from a similar perspective. See, e.g., MICHELE LANDIS DAUBER, THE 
SYMPATHETIC STATE: DISASTER RELIEF AND THE ORIGINS OF THE AMERICAN WELFARE STATE 
(2013); VIVIANA A. ROTMAN ZELIZER, MORALS AND MARKETS: THE DEVELOPMENT OF LIFE 
INSURANCE IN THE UNITED STATES (1979); EMBRACING RISK: THE CHANGING CULTURE OF 
INSURANCE AND RESPONSIBILITY (Tom Baker & Jonathan Simon eds., 2002); Kenneth S. 
Abraham, Efficiency and Fairness in Insurance Risk Classification, 71 VA. L. REV. 403 (1985); 
Molly J. Walker-Wilson, Cultural Understandings of Risk and the Tyranny of the Experts, 90 OR. 
L. REV. 113 (2011). 
 20. See Recreation in Addicks and Barker, U.S. ARMY CORPS ENGINEERS, 
https://www.swg.usace.army.mil/Missions/Dam-Safety-Program/Addicks-Barker-Recreation/ 
[https://perma.cc/S6Q9-RCXN] (last visited Mar. 4, 2019). 
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construction of the 13-mile-long earthen dam that encircles the reservoir in 
1945,21 the area was mostly undeveloped prairie.22 The government then 
began buying up the land within the reservoir. In a decision that would prove 
to be consequential, the government stopped short of buying all land within 
the reservoir’s maximum flood pool. Instead, it purchased only the land that 
would be flooded during a statistical construct colloquially known as a “100-
year flood,” a flood with a 1% chance of occurring in any given year.23 Areas 
outside the 100-year flood plain were left in private hands, free to be 
developed into residential neighborhoods in the 1980s, when Houston’s 
sprawl reached the area for the first time.24 Meanwhile, most of the people 
who moved in had “no clue” that their properties were susceptible to 
flooding.25 Filling up Barker Reservoir completely—and thereby flooding 
places like Canyon Gate—would require a more severe and therefore less 
likely flood, one with a 500-year or even a 1,000-year return interval. 
Hurricane Harvey was just such a flood.26 
                                                                                                                                            
 21. GALVESTON DIST., U.S. ARMY CORPS OF ENG’RS, WATER CONTROL MANUAL 3-2 
(2012), https://www.swg.usace.army.mil/Portals/26/docs/water%20control%20manual/2012%
20water%20control%20manual.pdf [https://perma.cc/EG4P-ZPZH]. 
 22. Neena Satija, Kiah Collier & Al Shaw, Everyone Knew Houston’s Reservoirs Would 
Flood—Except for the People Who Bought Homes Inside Them, PROPUBLICA, (Oct. 12, 2017) 
https://projects.propublica.org/graphics/harvey-reservoirs [https://perma.cc/4NHR-3878]. 
 23. Complaint at 7, Micu v. United States, 17-CV-01277 (Fed. Cl. Sept. 15, 2017). The two 
reservoirs were designed to capture and store more water than would fall during a 100-year storm. 
Instead, engineers estimated the probable maximum rainfall that could be expected to occur in 
the area, based on a storm that dumped over thirty inches of rain in seventy-two hours in 1899. 
Id. at 6. Subsequent storms, including Tropical Storm Claudette in 1979, caused the Corps to 
revise its estimate of the probable maximum rain upwards to forty inches in seventy-two hours, 
and to increase the height of Barker and Addicks dams, thereby increasing the size of the area 
they could flood. Id. at 5–6. 
 24. Wallace et al., supra note 7. 
 25. Wallace et al., supra note 7; Satija, Collier & Shaw, supra note 22; see also Audra D.S. 
Burch, Brutal Choice in Houston: Sell Home at a Loss or Face New Floods, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 
30, 2018), https://nyti.ms/2uwOW6b [https://perma.cc/SU5R-PPLN]; James Drew, Canyon Gate 
Homeowners Were Not Warned About Potential Flooding, HOUS. CHRON. (Oct. 7, 2017), 
https://www.houstonchronicle.com/news/houston-texas/houston/article/Canyon-Gate-bond-
prospectuses-did-not-warn-12259584.php [https://perma.cc/442S-E667]; Editorial, Homeowners 
May Have Had No Idea They Were in Flood Pool, But Many Others Did, HOUS. CHRON. (Oct. 4, 
2017), https://www.houstonchronicle.com/opinion/editorials/article/Homeowners-may-have-
had-no-idea-they-were-in-a-12253803.php [https://perma.cc/ZU5W-925S]. 
 26. Residents of Canyon Gate have filed a class action lawsuit against the federal 
government, arguing that the flooding of the area constituted a taking for which the plaintiffs are 
entitled to compensation. Complaint, Micu v. United States, 17-CV-01277, (Fed. Cl. Sept. 15, 
2017). Canyon Gate is not the only neighborhood located within one of Houston’s flood control 
reservoirs. There are about 2,000 acres of privately owned land containing thousands of homes 
located within Addicks and Barker Reservoirs. Satija, Collier & Shaw, supra note 22. 
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The story of Canyon Gate illustrates how hard it is for individuals to 
“know” the risk of flooding they face, and to process that knowledge when 
making choices about where to live. In fact, the project of knowing the flood 
risk one faces is fraught with difficulty. The science of flood risk is 
necessarily inexact, and the way FEMA digests that science and produces the 
flood maps that form the building blocks of the NFIP is deeply flawed. The 
idea of choice is similarly thorny. Many Americans do not choose where to 
live from among a menu of cities and neighborhoods with diverse exposure 
to the risk of flooding. These observations suggest that there is a significant 
group of people who are entitled to some assistance in paying for flood 
insurance. We should thus be more sensitive to the argument that people are 
entitled to continue paying less than actuarial premiums for flood insurance 
based not just on pure need, but also on factors like the length of time they 
have lived in a particular place and when their home was constructed, both 
of which affect rate calculations today. On the other hand, there is also a 
significant group of people who likely did know the risk and choose to 
encounter it, and this group should not be entitled to continue paying 
subsidized rates, nor should individual properties carry with them an 
entitlement to subsidized rates regardless of who lives in them, as they do 
now. 
This Article proceeds as follows. Part I provides a brief overview of the 
National Flood Insurance Program, with particular emphasis on its rate 
structure, the looming threat of climate change, and current proposals for 
reform. In Part II I draw on literature from insurance law and tort law to show, 
first, that the “actuarial model” of insurance is but one way of viewing and 
structuring insurance systems and, second, that the moral argument that flood 
risk should not be socialized because people subject to it have assumed it is 
dated and unpersuasive unless it incorporates meaningful conceptions of 
knowledge and choice, much as tort law has over the course of the twentieth 
century. Part III examines the problem of knowing the risk of flooding, and 
argues that many individuals lack meaningful knowledge of their risk. Part 
IV argues, similarly, that many people do not choose where they are going to 
live under conditions of freedom. Part V suggests implications of these ideas 
for reform of the NFIP. 
I. RISING TIDE, RISING COSTS 
The federal government socializes the costs of flooding in a variety of 
ways, including building and maintaining flood control structures, passing 
massive aid packages in the wake of major storms, and, most importantly for 
this paper, through the NFIP. While the total claims paid by the NFIP in the 
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wake of even major storms like Harvey or Katrina are usually dwarfed by 
one-off aid packages passed by Congress, they are often far larger for the 
individuals who receive them.27 NFIP coverage is also a liability rather than 
a discretionary aid package, and the total size of that liability is significant: 
currently about $1.3 trillion.28 This exposure has drawn increasing attention, 
as a series of historically significant losses and increasing awareness of the 
impacts of climate change on the nation’s flood risk have highlighted the 
degree to which the NFIP appears to be operating at a long-term deficit. 
A. A Brief Overview of the NFIP 
The NFIP was created in 1968, after decades of severe floods that had 
driven private insurers out of the market for flood insurance. The reasons for 
the insurance industry’s unwillingness to write flood insurance policies have 
been the subject of some debate, but two factors are widely thought to have 
played a crucial role: first, the extreme difficulty of understanding the risk 
faced by an individual policyholder (and thus setting premiums at levels that 
will cover expected losses), and second, a feature of flood risk known as 
correlation.29 When risks are correlated, they are likely to occur at the same 
time, leading to large and unevenly distributed losses for insurers. After 
Hurricane Betsy (the country’s first billion-dollar storm) struck the Gulf 
Coast in 1965, Congress directed the Department of Housing and Urban 
Development to prepare a report on the feasibility of a comprehensive 
approach to compensating flood victims.30 That report recommended the 
                                                                                                                                            
 27. The average NFIP claim paid for damage caused by Hurricane Harvey, for example, 
was $115,430, while the maximum amount of aid funding available under FEMA’s Individuals 
and Households Program is $34,000. Significant Flood Events, FEMA, 
https://www.fema.gov/significant-flood-events [https://perma.cc/J7EB-J6J4] (last updated Jan 
10, 2019); Notice of Maximum Amount of Assistance Under the Individuals and Households 
Program, 82 Fed. Reg. 196 (Oct. 12, 2017). On the other hand, the total NFIP claims paid for the 
three 2017 Hurricanes was $9.8 billion, compared with roughly $120 billion in Congressional 
appropriations (not including NFIP debt relief). See Brett Lingle, Carolyn Kousky & Leonard 
Shabman, Federal Disaster Rebuilding Spending: A Look at the Numbers, WHARTON, U. PA.: 
RISK MGMT. & DECISION PROCESSING CTR. (Feb. 22, 2018), https://riskcenter.wharton.upenn.edu/
disaster-aid/federal-disaster-rebuilding-spending-look-numbers/ [https://perma.cc/8FXH-YE83].  
 28. Policy Statistics, FEMA, https://bsa.nfipstat.fema.gov/reports/1011.htm 
[https://perma.cc/XY5Q-JE8Y] (last updated Sept. 30, 2018). 
 29. See Edward T. Pasterick, The National Flood Insurance Program, in PAYING THE PRICE: 
THE STATUS AND ROLE OF INSURANCE AGAINST NATURAL DISASTERS IN THE UNITED STATES 125, 
126 (Howard Kunreuther & Richard J. Roth eds., 1998). 
 30. Id. 
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creation of a national flood insurance program, which Congress did by 
passing the National Flood Insurance Act of 1968. 
In its role as administrator of the NFIP, FEMA undertakes three basic 
tasks. First, it studies the risk of flooding in every flood-prone community in 
the country, with the aim of developing detailed maps (“Flood Insurance Rate 
Maps,” or “FIRMs”) that show, for any individual property, the likelihood of 
being flooded. Second, FEMA promulgates regulations that are aimed at 
mitigating the risk of flooding in communities that participate in the NFIP 
(technically, the regulations direct local governments to incorporate the 
mitigation requirements into their building codes).31 The most significant of 
these requirements is that all new homes within “Special Flood Hazard 
Areas” (areas with a 1% chance of flooding in any given year) be elevated 
such that their living areas will remain dry during a 100-year flood.32 Finally, 
FEMA sets rates for flood insurance. 
Initially, the NFIP did not have a purchase mandate, and it relied on cheap 
premiums to attract policyholders.33 From the beginning, one problem was 
the premiums that would be charged to houses that existed when the program 
was created. Homes that post-date the creation of a flood map covering their 
area are subject to the building code’s elevation requirements and therefore 
have far lower expected losses in the event of a 100-year flood. Their flood 
insurance premiums are thus lower. Homes that predate the creation of a map 
are subject to no such requirements (the NFIP does not require that existing 
homes be elevated unless they are “substantially”—more than 50%—
damaged in a storm)34 and thus face a much higher risk. At least in part to 
induce participation in the NFIP,35 FEMA created a category of rates it calls 
“chargeable” rates (more often referred to as “subsidized” rates)36 that apply 
to two major groups of policyholders. First, properties that were constructed 
before the issuance of a FIRM are entitled to purchase flood insurance at 
subsidized rates.37 Second, properties whose rates increase are entitled to pay 
their old, “grandfathered” rates, which are often substantially below FEMA’s 
current estimate of full actuarial rates.38 
This approach to attracting policyholders was essentially a failure, and in 
1973 Congress required all properties located within Special Flood Hazard 
                                                                                                                                            
 31. See 44 C.F.R. §§ 60.2, 60.3 (2018). 
 32. § 60.3(c)(2). 
 33. Pasterick, supra note 29, at 132–34.  
 34. 44 C.F.R. § 59.1. 
 35. Pasterick, supra note 29, at 134. 
 36. 44 C.F.R. §§ 59.1, 61.7.  
 37. Pasterick, supra note 29, at 132. 
 38.  U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, supra note 13, at 7. 
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Areas that have a mortgage from a federally-insured lending institution to 
carry flood insurance.39 Despite the addition of a purchase mandate, Congress 
did not eliminate subsidized rates. Although their share as a percentage of the 
total pool of policyholders has decreased substantially, subsidized rates are 
still paid by about 20% of policyholders.40 In 2012, Congress passed the 
Biggert-Waters Flood Insurance Reform Act, which eliminated significant 
categories of subsidized rates and was hailed as a major bipartisan success.41 
Biggert-Waters eliminated the practice of “grandfathering” old rates42 and 
also eliminated subsidized rates for second homes, properties that undergo 
substantial flood damage or improvements, properties that have flooded 
numerous times, and businesses.43 Moreover, under the new law, new owners 
of a home would no longer be able to continue paying the subsidized rates 
enjoyed by their predecessors.44 Those who acquired flood insurance for the 
first time would also not be entitled to subsidized rates.45 
Biggert-Waters, poised to move most policyholders to full actuarial rates, 
attracted enormous controversy. As homeowners received notices that their 
rates would be skyrocketing, opposition to the new law began to build in 
many flood-prone communities. What had been hailed as a bipartisan success 
now attracted bipartisan scorn.46 Particularly moving were anecdotal reports 
that individuals would now be required to pay truly crushing flood insurance 
premiums—in one case, a woman reported that her premiums were set to 
increase from $595 a year to $4,492, on a $90,000 home.47 Also noted were 
widespread fears that the law was having a sudden impact on the real estate 
                                                                                                                                            
 39. Flood Disaster Protection Act of 1973, Pub. L. No. 93-234 (codified at 42 U.S.C. 
§§ 4001–4129 (2018)). 
 40. U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, supra note 13, at 6. 
 41. Biggert-Waters Flood Insurance Reform Act of 2012, Pub. L. No. 112-141, § 100205, 
126 Stat. 405, 917 (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 4014 (2018)). The bill enjoyed support from both 
fiscal conservatives, concerned by the NFIP’s drain on taxpayers, and environmentalists, who 
saw higher flood insurance premiums as a way to incentivize more sustainable development. 
 42. § 100207. 
 43. § 100205(a)(1)(A). 
 44. § 100205(a)(1)(B). 
 45. Id. The law also increased the cap on annual premium increases. These changes and 
their history are discussed in more detail in Lemann, supra note 13, at 192–96. 
 46. See, e.g., Coral Davenport, Popular Flood Insurance Law Is Target of Both Parties, 
N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 28, 2014), https://nyti.ms/1k4eRCw [http://perma.cc/G2QG-YSXJ] (“Diane 
Mazzuca . . . had been paying $595 annually for flood insurance on her $90,000 home. After 
Biggert-Waters ended federal flood insurance subsidies last June, she got an updated bill—for 
$4,492.”). 
 47. Id. 
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market, potentially wiping out many homeowners’ equity.48 One of the law’s 
lead sponsors, Maxine Waters, claimed she had had no idea the effect it would 
have and supported its repeal.49 
Just twenty months after Biggert-Waters was passed, Congress passed the 
Homeowner Flood Insurance Affordability Act of 2014 (“HFIAA”), which 
largely repealed it. The Act reinstated subsidized rates for new policies and 
newly purchased properties.50 It also reinstated, with some new limitations, 
the practice of grandfathering rates.51 The cost of these changes was offset, at 
least in theory, by a new $25 annual surcharge on all residential policies and 
a $250 surcharge on policies covering businesses and second homes.52 The 
Homeowner Flood Insurance Affordability Act was Congress’s last 
significant reform to the NFIP. Since then the program’s fortunes have not 
prospered. 
B. The Stresses of Climate Change 
Until 2005, the NFIP typically collected enough in premiums to cover the 
claims it paid to flood victims.53 In one season, Hurricanes Katrina, Rita, and 
Wilma combined to create $19 billion in claims (more than the entire 
cumulative losses of the program since its creation), easily overwhelming the 
NFIP’s reserves and forcing it to borrow from the Treasury.54 This 
necessitated an increase in its statutory borrowing limit (which had been $1.5 
billion).55 The borrowing limit was increased several more times in 
subsequent years, as losses from other storms (most notably Hurricane 
Sandy) continued to build and the program began making onerous interest 
                                                                                                                                            
 48. See, e.g., Lizette Alvarez & Campbell Robertson, Cost of Flood Insurance Rises, Along 
with Worries, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 12, 2013), https://nyti.ms/1bO4G4P [http://perma.cc/XNG4-
RH4T] (reporting that in some areas “home sales have come to a near standstill”). 
 49. Davenport, supra note 46. As some commentators have observed, this claim is dubious 
at best. Verchick & Johnson, supra note 13, at 711–12. 
 50. Homeowner Flood Insurance Affordability Act of 2014, Pub. L. No. 113-89, § 3, 128 
Stat. 1020, 1021–22 (striking portions of Biggert-Waters § 100205, Pub. L. No. 112-141, 126 
Stat. 405, 917 (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 4014(g)(1)–(2) (2018))). 
 51. Id. § 4. 
 52. Id. § 8. 
 53. NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL, REDUCING COASTAL RISKS ON THE EAST AND GULF COASTS 
50 (2014); see also RACHEL CLEETUS, OVERWHELMING RISK: RETHINKING FLOOD INSURANCE IN 
A WORLD OF RISING SEAS 8 (2013) (showing NFIP’s cumulative debt over time). The largest debt 
the NFIP had before Katrina was $917 million, incurred in 1997 and paid off at the end of 2003. 
Horn, supra note 11. 
 54. NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL, supra note 53, at 50. The program is statutorily entitled to 
ask the Treasury for loans when it experiences shortfalls. 42 U.S.C. § 4016 (2018). 
 55. Horn, supra note 11. 
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payments.56 When Hurricanes Harvey, Irma, and Maria arrived in 2017, the 
NFIP quickly hit its new $30 billion borrowing limit. To make the program 
solvent, Congress cancelled $16 billion worth of its debt.57 Despite that relief, 
the NFIP currently owes $20.525 billion to the Treasury.58 
There are widely thought to be two major contributors to the program’s 
recent financial woes. First is the widespread development that has occurred 
in the past few decades in flood-prone areas along the coasts.59 Second, and 
perhaps far more significant, is climate change. While scientists are generally 
loath to assign the blame for any individual event to climate change,60 there 
is broad consensus that a warming atmosphere will make flooding worse in a 
variety of ways. Warmer oceans might provide more energy to hurricanes, 
making them more destructive.61 Warmer air holds more moisture, increasing 
the potential for extreme rainfall and flooding from rivers.62 And finally, and 
perhaps most catastrophically, thermal expansion and melting ice will cause 
sea levels to rise permanently, causing increasingly frequent “nuisance 
flooding” on sunny days, increasingly destructive surges on stormy ones, and 
finally, permanent inundation. 
The precise effect of all these changes on the flood risk in any given area 
is extraordinarily difficult to predict.63 But the overall effect on the country 
                                                                                                                                            
 56. Id. The NFIP currently pays about $400 million per year in interest to the Treasury. Id. 
Since 2005, it has paid $4.2 billion in interest and $2.82 billion in principal. Id. 
 57. Id. 
 58. Id. 
 59. Raymond J. Burby, Hurricane Katrina and the Paradoxes of Government Disaster 
Policy: Bringing About Wise Governmental Decisions for Hazardous Areas, 604 ANNALS AM. 
ACAD. POL. & SOC. SCI. 171, 173–76 (2006); Scott Gabriel Knowles & Howard C. Kunreuther, 
Troubled Waters: The National Flood Insurance Program in Historical Perspective, 26 J. POL’Y 
HIST. 327, 327–28 (2014); Oliver A. Houck, Rising Water: The National Flood Insurance 
Program and Louisiana, 60 TUL. L. REV. 61, 62–63, 66 (1985). 
 60. This is beginning to change. See Henry Fountain, Scientists Link Hurricane Harvey’s 
Record Rainfall to Climate Change, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 13, 2017), https://nyti.ms/2nYKTMz 
[http://perma.cc/9FFM-YJRR] (noting that “for years most scientists had said it was extremely 
difficult to link warming to specific events. [But] [t]hat has now changed”). 
 61. NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL, supra note 53, at 14–16 (noting that climate models predict 
a decrease in the number of hurricanes but also an increase in their intensity and rainfall rates).  
 62. U.S. GLOB. CHANGE RESEARCH PROGRAM, CLIMATE CHANGE IMPACTS IN THE UNITED 
STATES 7–14 (Jerry M. Melillo, Terese Richmond & Gary W. Yohe eds., 2014), 
https://nca2014.globalchange.gov/downloads [http://perma.cc/6KPJ-B8XR] (last visited Dec. 22, 
2018). This problem was vividly illustrated in August 2016, when rainfall in southern Louisiana 
caused flooding that killed thirteen people and displaced tens of thousands. The event was the 
eighth since May 2015 involving a quantity of rainfall statistically rare enough to have only a 
0.2% chance of occurring in any given year (also known as a 500-year flood). Jonah Engel 
Bromwich, Flooding in the South Looks a Lot Like Climate Change, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 16, 2016), 
https://nyti.ms/2bkXOkk [http://perma.cc/CH2P-M889].  
 63. See infra Part III.A. 
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and on the NFIP will be extreme. A recent report released by the Union of 
Concerned Scientists attempted to project the impact sea level rise will have 
on coastal real estate. The report estimated that within fifteen years, 147,000 
existing homes and 7,000 commercial properties, collectively worth $63 
billion, will be at risk of “chronic inundation” (defined as at least twenty-six 
floods per year).64 By 2100, 2.4 million residential properties (home to 4.7 
million people) and 107,000 commercial properties worth more than $1 
trillion will be effectively underwater.65 Other studies have produced similar 
figures.66 In many places these effects are already beginning to be felt.67 
C. Proposals for Reform: The Current Landscape 
The NFIP’s fiscal troubles and the likely effects of climate change suggest 
to most observers that the program is in dire need of reform. The NFIP has 
always had two goals that are to some extent inherently in tension. First, it 
aims to provide coverage that helps soften the financial impact of major 
floods. And second, it aims to help lessen the effects of floods themselves by 
imposing adaptation requirements on new construction in floodplains. The 
program’s spiraling debt implies that something about this model is broken. 
To many, the program’s debt suggests a massive subsidy flowing from 
taxpayers to the residents of flood-prone houses. On this view, the NFIP 
encourages people to live in harm’s way, by partially externalizing the costs 
of flooding. In insurance this is called a moral hazard, the idea that providing 
insurance against a risk can increase its likelihood (think of the driver who 
                                                                                                                                            
 64. UNION OF CONCERNED SCIENTISTS, UNDERWATER: RISING SEAS, CHRONIC FLOODS, AND 
THE IMPLICATIONS FOR US COASTAL REAL ESTATE 4–5 (2018), 
https://www.ucsusa.org/sites/default/files/attach/2018/06/underwater-analysis-full-report.pdf 
[http://perma.cc/92XN-UDG3].  
 65. Id. at 5. 
 66. See Tatiana Schlossberg, Rising Sea Levels May Disrupt Lives of Millions, Study Says, 
N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 14, 2016), http://www.nytimes.com/2016/03/15/science/rising-sea-levels-
global-warming-climate-change.html [http://perma.cc/BNT4-JT83]; see also Matthew E. Hauer 
et al., Millions Projected to Be at Risk from Sea-Level Rise in the Continental United States, 6 
NATURE CLIMATE CHANGE 691, 691 (2016) (concluding that coastal inundation could lead to a 
population shift comparable to the “Great Migration” of African-Americans out of the South in 
the twentieth century). 
 67. Justin Gillis, Seas Are Rising at Fastest Rate in Last 28 Centuries, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 22, 
2016), https://www.nytimes.com/2016/02/23/science/sea-level-rise-global-warming-climate-
change.html [http://perma.cc/985S-QCM2] (noting that “increasingly routine” flooding is 
“making life miserable in places like Miami Beach; Charleston, S.C.; and Norfolk, Va., even on 
sunny days”); Justin Gillis, Flooding of Coast, Caused by Global Warming, Has Already Begun, 
N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 3, 2016), http://www.nytimes.com/2016/09/04/science/flooding-of-coast-
caused-by-global-warming-has-already-begun.html [http://perma.cc/SG6M-HXR2]. 
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speeds through town, comfortable in the knowledge that any damage will be 
covered).68 Risk-rated premiums are a way of combatting moral hazard 
(increase the driver’s premiums for speeding and you might discourage that 
behavior), but the NFIP is unable to charge premiums that are adequately 
risk-rated whenever policyholders are entitled by law to pay less than 
actuarial rates. The NFIP’s debt is also seen as problematic in absolute terms. 
The U.S. Government Accountability Office has featured the NFIP on its 
“High-Risk List” since 2006 and highlights the risk the program poses to the 
Treasury.69 
The NFIP has thus attracted a diverse coalition of critics. To small-
government types, it is yet another endeavor the government should leave to 
the private sector.70 To fiscal conservatives, its huge exposure to catastrophic 
losses that get passed on to the Treasury is cause for concern.71 To 
environmentalists, it encourages flood-prone development, which harms 
fragile wetland and coastal ecosystems, and helps us ignore the long-term 
                                                                                                                                            
 68. See Alexander B. Lemann, Coercive Insurance and the Soul of Tort Law, 105 GEO. L.J. 
55, 59–61 (2016). 
 69.  U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-17-317, HIGH RISK SERIES: PROGRESS ON 
MANY HIGH-RISK AREAS, WHILE SUBSTANTIAL EFFORTS NEEDED ON OTHERS 58 (2017), 
https://www.gao.gov/assets/690/682765.pdf [http://perma.cc/3KEK-RXSK] [hereinafter HIGH 
RISK SERIES]. 
 70. See, e.g., IKE BRANNON & ARI BLASK, REFORMING THE NATIONAL FLOOD INSURANCE 
PROGRAM: TOWARD PRIVATE FLOOD INSURANCE 4 (Cato Inst. Policy Analysis No. 817, 2017), 
https://object.cato.org/sites/cato.org/files/pubs/pdf/pa817_2.pdf [http://perma.cc/S4PF-2W6L] 
(arguing that the NFIP’s problems are “endemic to any government insurance scheme” and that 
they “show[]  the importance of a growing private flood insurance market as an alternative to 
government-run insurance”); Editorial, The Swampland Republicans: GOP Senators Balk at Even 
Modest Fixes in Federal Flood Insurance, WALL ST. J. (Jan. 16, 2018), https://www.wsj.com/
articles/the-swampland-republicans-1516145995 [http://perma.cc/P5P4-969E] (“The larger 
question is why government underwrites flood insurance when consumers privately insure against 
car accidents, fires and other events that damage property.”). 
 71.  See, e.g., DIANE KATZ, THE NATIONAL FLOOD INSURANCE PROGRAM: DROWNING IN 
DEBT AND DUE FOR PHASE-OUT 2 (Heritage Found. Backgrounder No. 3224, 2017), 
https://www.heritage.org/sites/default/files/2017-06/BG3224.pdf [http://perma.cc/KU73-D5FZ] 
(“Tinkering with operational reforms will not remedy the distortionary incentives inherent in a 
government insurance scheme—especially because the NFIP, as designed, is financially 
unsound.”). 
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costs and consequences of climate change.72 For liberals, the NFIP looks 
suspiciously like a boon to wealthy southerners with coastal mansions.73 
In a way, the preceding paragraph overstates the political valence of the 
NFIP; one can read dozens of critics of the program without being made 
aware of their political leanings.74 That is in part because the NFIP appears 
to be so illogical that one need not appeal to any prior political commitment 
to make a convincing case against it. There is a rationalist, utilitarian strain 
in modern political thought that is common ground for elites of both parties. 
From the perspective of incentives and rational policy, it seems obvious that 
the NFIP needs to be “fixed,” so that it no longer encourages clearly sub-
optimal behavior. In a nation of nudges, the NFIP seems to be nudging us in 
the wrong direction. 
The call for reform of the NFIP thus virtually always includes the idea 
that, among other fixes and tweaks, policyholders should be paying full 
actuarial rates.75 Some favor simply eliminating the program outright, based 
on the assumption that flood insurance offered by private insurers would 
feature more accurate risk-rated premiums.76 Within that group, some take 
the straightforward view that anyone who fails to secure flood insurance in 
                                                                                                                                            
 72.  See, e.g., Brian Palmer, Our National Flood Insurance Program Is Going Underwater, 
NAT’L RES. DEF. COUNCIL (July 13, 2017), https://www.nrdc.org/stories/our-national-flood-
insurance-program-going-underwater [http://perma.cc/5TZ5-XBWG] (“Climate change makes it 
increasingly urgent that we find a fix for our outdated flood insurance program.”). 
 73.  See, e.g., Brannon & Blask, supra note 10 (noting that “the median value of an NFIP 
insured home is about twice that of American homes in general” and that “Southeast Atlantic 
Coast senators are sure to object to any changes that might make their constituents pay more”). 
 74.  For example, Ike Brannon and Ari Blask are both affiliated with the right-leaning Cato 
Institute but have had their views on flood insurance published widely, including by the left-
leaning Politico.com. 
 75.  See sources cited supra note 13. 
 76.  See BRANNON & BLASK, supra note 70 (“The ideal ‘reform’ to the NFIP would be to 
fully privatize flood insurance.”); Ben-Shahar & Logue, supra note 13, at 626 (calling for “ending 
government-run weather insurance”); Charlene Luke & Aviva Abramovsky, Managing the Next 
Deluge: A Tax System Approach to Flood Insurance, 18 CONN. INS. L.J. 1, 21–22 (2011); Kildow 
& Scorse, supra note 8; Bonnie Kristian, The Perverse Incentives of the National Flood Insurance 
Program, WEEK (Aug. 29, 2017), https://theweek.com/articles/721185/perverse-incentives-
national-flood-insurance-program [https://perma.cc/3PDS-42CV]; Daniel Schwarcz, How to Fix 
America’s Broken Flood Insurance Scheme, WASH. POST (Sept. 7, 2017), 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/how-to-fix-americas-broken-flood-insurance-
scheme/2017/09/07/7cb5d2fe-93d9-11e7-aace-04b862b2b3f3_story.html 
[https://perma.cc/CD8N-866W]. Interestingly, Ben-Shahar and Logue follow their call to 
eliminate the NFIP by observing that the government is likely to simply replace flood insurance 
payments with post-disaster aid, which they call “an irresistible instinct of a decent society.” Ben-
Shahar & Logue, supra note 13, at 625–26. 
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the private market (or finds it too expensive) should be simply out of luck.77 
The far more common position, recognizing the fact that a private market for 
flood insurance is only now beginning to emerge,78 favors reform. To 
reformers there is much in the complex program that seems in need of fixing, 
but the overwhelming target is the NFIP’s rate structure. The proposed reform 
is straightforward: ensure that all policyholders pay full actuarial rates, 
essentially reinstating Biggert-Waters.79 
Most critics of the program acknowledge that there is some subset of 
policyholders who would face significant financial hardship if forced to pay 
for flood insurance at full actuarial rates. The solution to this problem is not 
to retain the current system of subsidies and grandfathering, but rather to offer 
assistance in one form or another based on need as measured according to 
one of several possible variables.80 The idea that anyone should be entitled to 
affordable flood insurance for any reason other than pure financial need is 
typically dismissed by an appeal to the concept of choice: people living in 
flood-prone areas have chosen to do so, and so have no claim to cheap 
insurance.81 A more sophisticated argument, built on the same premise and 
more commonly seen in academic commentary than in the popular press, is 
the idea that flood insurance prices can and should function as Pigouvian 
                                                                                                                                            
 77.  See Kildow & Scorse, supra note 8 (“Homeowners and businesses should be responsible 
for purchasing their own flood insurance on the private market, if they can find it. If they can’t, 
then the market is telling them that where they live is too dangerous.”). 
 78.  As noted above, the NFIP was created at a time when private flood insurance was non-
existent. See Pasterick, supra note 29, at 126. Private companies have been involved in various 
aspects of the program since then. See id. at 134–35. Only recently, however, has a market for 
purely private flood insurance (i.e., policies written by private insurers that leave those insurers 
responsible for paying claims) begun to emerge. See CAROLYN KOUSKY ET AL., WHARTON RISK 
MGMT. & DECISION PROCESSES CTR., THE EMERGING PRIVATE RESIDENTIAL FLOOD INSURANCE 
MARKET IN THE UNITED STATES 1 (2018), https://d1c25a6gwz7q5e.cloudfront.net/reports/07-13-
18-Emerging%20Flood%20Insurance%20Market%20Report.pdf [https://perma.cc/MYC3-
5WR3]. The extent to which the private market could replace the NFIP is hotly contested and 
remains a somewhat theoretical question with private insurance currently representing only 3.5 to 
4.5% of residential policies nationwide. Id. at 1–2. The best evidence appears to be that “the 
private sector will never be able to write policies for certain properties or locations . . . at a price 
homeowners would be willing to pay.” Id. at 2. 
 79.  Various other shortcomings of the program will be discussed in more detail below. They 
include principally the idea that all of the program’s rates are too low, because for various reasons 
it underestimates the risk its policyholders face. See infra Part III.B. Other more technical 
shortcomings that have attracted considerable attention include the underenforcement of the 
NFIP’s purchase mandate and the underenforcement of its mitigation and adaptation 
requirements. 
 80.  See BRANNON & BLASK, supra note 70; U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, supra 
note 13, at 23–25. 
 81.  See supra note 8 and accompanying text. 
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taxes, inducing efficient precaution on the part of policyholders by forcing 
them to internalize the costs of their risky lifestyles.82 There is merit to these 
arguments, and they are persuasive as applied to large swaths of NFIP 
policyholders. But too often they are applied universally, and the premises on 
which they are based go unexamined. 
II. ASSUMPTION OF RISK AND THE MORAL CONTENT OF INSURANCE 
Making all NFIP policyholders pay full actuarial rates is not a self-
justifying goal. To be sure, it would at least in theory make the program self-
sufficient and thus eliminate its effect on the budget. And because the NFIP 
is designed as an insurance program, it is often assumed that it should 
function like a private insurance company and thus turn a profit, or at least 
break even.83 But if the NFIP is seen as a program that is designed to help 
people manage the risk of and recover quickly from floods, a deeper question 
comes into focus: should the risk of floods be socialized? Insurance 
scholarship has long recognized that insurance systems can shift and spread 
risk in various ways. Deciding how an insurance system covering a set of 
risks should be designed involves evaluating a range of arguments for and 
against the practice of risk rating, including arguments from efficiency and 
arguments from fairness. The public discourse surrounding the NFIP has 
tended to focus on efficiency arguments at the expense of fairness arguments, 
and particularly the idea that people do (or do not) knowingly choose to 
encounter the risk of flood. The development of tort doctrine in this area 
suggests that this argument is only persuasive where people have subjective 
knowledge of the risk and a meaningful choice of whether to encounter it. 
A. Individualism vs. Solidarity in Insurance Systems 
Insurance systems need not be structured so that each individual 
policyholder bears the full magnitude of his individual risk. The “actuarial 
                                                                                                                                            
 82.  See Ben-Shahar & Logue, supra note 13, at 575–76. 
 83.  See Kristian, supra note 76 (contrasting the NFIP with a “normal insurance company,” 
which “would jack up the premium price to cover the high risk of floodplain construction”); 
Brannon & Blask, supra note 10 (“The NFIP’s main problem is that it doesn’t really function like 
private insurance.”). It is perhaps worth noting that many lines of insurance are profitable only 
because of the value insurance companies derive from investing their “float,” the pool of 
premiums the insurance company holds and draws on to pay claims. The NFIP, by contrast, has 
never been able to invest its float. To my knowledge, there has been no empirical study examining 
how much the program would have had in reserves when Hurricane Katrina struck in 2005 had it 
spent the previous 40 years earning a return on its float. 
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vision” of insurance—the idea that an insurance system ideally charges “risk-
based premiums based on the best available information regarding the 
expected losses of the individuals insured”—is only one of several ways of 
seeing insurance systems.84 This view of insurance rose to prominence in the 
mid-twentieth century, and supplanted earlier, more solidaristic ways of 
seeing insurance, typified by the fraternal insurance societies of the late 
nineteenth and early twentieth centuries.85 So successful has the actuarial 
vision of insurance become that today, “many well-informed people would 
deny that it is a vision at all and assert, instead, that it is the model of 
insurance.”86 Insurance is thus treated as a phenomenon that calls for purely 
economic, rather than humanistic, analysis.87 Nevertheless, a small group of 
scholars from various disciplines has long insisted that insurance cannot be 
fully understood without examining the culture in which it exists.88 
While the actuarial model may be intellectually dominant, it has not totally 
supplanted other ways of structuring the insurance systems we rely on today. 
It is by no means the case that every form of insurance requires each 
policyholder to pay rates that reflect the full extent of her personal risk.89 Put 
another way, insurance often contains “cross subsidies,” in which one group 
of policyholders pays less than actuarial rates at the expense of another group. 
Life insurance is probably the most “actuarial” insurance currently available, 
with premiums charged based on age, sex, tobacco use, and successful 
completion of a comprehensive health screening.90 Individuals who purchase 
                                                                                                                                            
 84.  Tom Baker & Jonathan Simon, Embracing Risk, in EMBRACING RISK: THE CHANGING 
CULTURE OF INSURANCE AND RESPONSIBILITY, supra note 19, at 1, 9–10. 
 85.  See id. at 10; see also JOHN FABIAN WITT, THE ACCIDENTAL REPUBLIC: CRIPPLED 
WORKINGMEN, DESTITUTE WIDOWS, AND THE REMAKING OF AMERICAN LAW 209–10 (2004). 
 86.  Baker & Simon, supra note 84, at 10 (emphasis in original). 
 87.  Id. at 13 (“[I]nsurance has been almost completely ignored by the traditional humanities 
and social sciences, at least outside of economics departments and business schools. As a result, 
neoclassical economics is now the dominant paradigm for the analysis of insurance and risk. . . . 
Policy debates over the nature and extent of public insurance and the regulation of private 
insurance are almost always framed in economic terms.”). 
 88.  One pioneering work in this category is ZELIZER, supra note 19. Zelizer, a sociologist, 
showed that the rise of life insurance in the early nineteenth century was largely the result of 
cultural forces, and particularly a shift from seeing life insurance as an immoral form of gambling 
on the lives of one’s family to a form of prudent savings. See id. at 74–102. 
 89.  See Ronen Avraham, Kyle D. Logue & Daniel Schwarcz, Understanding Insurance 
Antidiscrimination Laws, 87 S. CAL. L. REV. 195, 235–67 (2014) (surveying and analyzing laws 
that prevent insurers from discriminating among insureds in pricing premiums). 
 90.  Tom Baker, Risk, Insurance, and the Social Construction of Responsibility, in 
EMBRACING RISK: THE CHANGING CULTURE OF INSURANCE AND RESPONSIBILITY, supra note 19, 
at 33, 46 (“[T]here are great variations in the degree of solidarity insurance institutions embody. 
Individual life insurance, with its underwriting guidelines and risk classifications, epitomizes the 
individualistic end of the insurance spectrum; Social Security, with its mandatory participation 
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health insurance through their employers (as the majority of Americans do), 
by contrast, often pay rates that have little or no relationship to their 
individual risk. 
The Affordable Care Act, in particular, reflects the judgment that 
individuals should not have to pay more for health insurance based on a 
variety of factors that affect their health risk.91 Insurers may not charge higher 
rates for people who are obese or diabetic or female,92 for example, despite 
the correlation between such factors and the likelihood of needing costly 
medical care. Indeed, the only factors insurers can use to discriminate among 
individual insureds in setting premiums are age (with the limitation that the 
premiums for older insureds be no more than three times as costly as those 
for younger insureds), tobacco use (with the limitation that premiums for 
tobacco users be no more than 1.5 times those for non-users), type of plan 
(individual or family), and geography.93 
This structure of health insurance premiums suggests a judgment that must 
be in large part moral.94 Our society has decided (not without controversy, to 
                                                                                                                                            
and income-based premiums and benefits, the solidaristic end. A health care plan with community 
rating (everyone pays the same premium) and open enrollment (no one is turned away) is more 
solidaristic than a plan that charges the sick more than the healthy and turns the riskiest applicants 
away.”). 
 91. See Jessica L. Roberts & Elizabeth Weeks Leonard, What Is (And Isn’t) Healthism?, 50 
GA. L. REV. 833, 836 (2016) (noting that “[t]he ACA notoriously prohibits private health insurers 
from considering individual health-risk profiles in underwriting, ratemaking, or renewals, subject 
to several exceptions”). 
 92.  See 42 U.S.C. § 18116 (2018) (addressing discrimination and participation in health 
insurance plans funded by the federal government); id. § 300gg(a)(1) (enumerating the sole 
acceptable grounds for charging a higher rate). 
 93.  Id. § 18116; see also Genetic Information Nondiscrimination Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 
110-233, §§ 101–02, 122 Stat. 881, 883, 888 (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. § 1182(b) and 42 
U.S.C. § 300gg(a)(l)(B)) (prohibiting health insurers from denying coverage or rating premiums 
based on genetic information). 
 94.  See Abraham, supra note 19 (exploring the “moral implications” of risk classification); 
Avraham, Logue & Schwarcz, supra note 89, at 202 (describing laws limiting risk classification 
as presenting a tradeoff between efficiency and fairness). Indeed, a utilitarian would argue that 
insurance premiums should be risk-rated to the extent that the characteristics associated with 
higher risk are within the control of the insured and thus can be subject to a kind of Pigouvian 
tax, creating efficient deterrence. Having to pay higher premiums for being obese, for example, 
might create an incentive to lose weight (much like a soda tax). And vice versa: socializing the 
costs of obesity by banning its use as a factor in setting premiums creates moral hazard, 
incentivizing people to become obese. See Jonathan Klick & Thomas Stratmann, Diabetes 
Treatments and Moral Hazard, 50 J.L. & ECON. 519, 527–31 (2007) (arguing that mandates for 
medical treatment for diabetes cause people to become more obese); see also Max N. Helveston, 
Consumer Protection in the Age of Big Data, 93 WASH. U. L. REV. 859, 913 (2016) (noting that 
“[t]he ACA’s provisions also limit the impact that insurers’ premium setting practices will have 
on individuals’ personal choices”); cf. Ronen Avraham, The Economics of Insurance Law—A 
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be sure) that the healthcare costs associated with obesity or diabetes or 
childbearing are not to be borne exclusively by the group of people subject 
to those risks, and should instead be spread (or cross-subsidized). Scholarship 
on insurance law has identified a range of arguments that have been used to 
support laws against risk classification in insurance pricing.95 Generally, 
arguments from efficiency favor more individualistic, actuarial ways of 
structuring insurance, while arguments from equity favor more solidaristic 
ways of structuring insurance.96 
On the efficiency side is a basket of arguments that will already be familiar 
from the current scholarly and popular dialogue about the NFIP, reflecting 
the intellectual dominance of the actuarial vision of insurance. Perhaps most 
prominent here is the argument that insurance premiums must be risk-rated 
to combat moral hazard. To put the point another way, risk-rated insurance 
can function as a kind of “Pigouvian tax,” forcing individuals to internalize 
the costs of the risks they generate and thus inducing efficient behavior.97 In 
the flood insurance context, the fear is that charging lower than actuarial rates 
to some policyholders causes them to move to or remain in flood-prone 
houses. The NFIP combats moral hazard not just by charging different rates 
to those with different risk but also by regulating behavior through local 
building codes.98 
Another argument commonly used in favor of actuarial rates is adverse 
selection: the idea that charging relatively high rates to low-risk people will 
cause them to forego insurance entirely, leaving the insurance pool with an 
ever riskier and thus more expensive population.99 The NFIP does have a 
purchase mandate, but it only applies within the 100-year floodplain, 
rendering it ineffective as a tool against adverse selection by lower-risk 
insureds.100 While there are a variety of other efficiency-based arguments that 
are used in support of risk-based premium pricing, moral hazard and adverse 
selection are the two most important.101 
                                                                                                                                            
Primer, 19 CONN. INS. L.J. 29, 40–41 (2012) (discussing, as an example of this phenomenon, a 
fire insurance premium that incentivizes investment in sprinkler systems); Avraham, Logue & 
Schwarcz, supra note 89, at 198 (noting that “risk classification by insurers can . . . create 
incentives for insureds to minimize risks”). 
 95. See, e.g., Avraham, Logue & Schwarcz, supra note 89; Abraham, supra note 19. 
 96. See Abraham, supra note 19, at 404. 
 97.  See Ben-Shahar & Logue, supra note 13, at 575–76. 
 98.  See Lemann, supra note 13, at 183. 
 99.  This argument figured prominently in the design of the Affordable Care Act’s individual 
mandate, which was seen as necessary to combat precisely this problem. 
 100.  See 42 U.S.C. § 4012a(b) (2018); Luke & Abramovsky, supra note 76, at 13–15. 
 101.  One efficiency-based argument that is sometimes marshalled against the use of risk 
classification in insurance pricing is the idea that certain risky behavior generates positive 
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Arrayed against these arguments from efficiency is a set of arguments 
from equity or fairness, each of which supports laws against risk 
classification in insurance pricing. The most commonly advanced and 
important such argument in this context is the idea that people should not be 
punished for characteristics that are beyond their control.102 So, for example, 
health insurers are permitted to charge higher premiums to those who smoke, 
but not to women.103 Laws against risk classification are also often justified 
on purely distributional grounds.104 The Affordable Care Act’s requirement 
that the elderly pay health insurance premiums no more than three times 
higher than the young, for instance, is a cross-subsidy from the young to the 
old justified at least in part on the idea that the elderly are in need of 
assistance.105 
The debate over reform of the NFIP largely ignores this “control” 
argument. When scholars and pundits argue that the NFIP should be reformed 
so that each policyholder pays full actuarial rates, they often make two 
assumptions. First is the assumption that the only argument against actuarial 
rates must be the redistributional argument sketched out above. Subsidized 
flood insurance rates have often been defended (particularly by the people 
paying them and their representatives in Congress) on the ground that higher 
rates would not be affordable and so would impose a crushing burden on 
those who are mandated to carry flood insurance, forcing them to move and 
wiping out their home equity.106 Critics have made two compelling responses 
to this argument. First, the cross-subsidy built into the rate structure of the 
NFIP from those paying full actuarial rates to those paying subsidized rates 
is only defensible on redistributional grounds if there is in fact a correlation 
                                                                                                                                            
externalities and so should be subsidized through cheap premiums. Avraham, Logue & Schwarcz, 
supra note 89, at 210. This argument has been made in the context of flood risk, although not in 
these terms or in connection with NFIP premiums per se. In the wake of Hurricane Katrina, many 
in New Orleans argued that the city deserved the investment the federal government was making 
in its recovery and continued protection because of its important role in shaping American culture. 
See, e.g., TOM PIAZZA, WHY NEW ORLEANS MATTERS (2005). 
 102. See Abraham, supra note 19, at 429 (“[R]isk classes should be based on variables that 
are within the control of or at least caused by the insured.”); Avraham, Logue & Schwarcz, supra 
note 89, at 214–15 (“The economic costs associated with [risks that are beyond an individual’s 
control] should be distributed in a morally blind manner.”). 
 103.  Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, 42 U.S.C. § 18116 (2018). 
 104. Abraham, supra note 19, at 444–45. 
 105.  See, e.g., Theodore W. Ruger, Can a Patient-Centered Ethos Be Other-Regarding? 
Ought It Be?, 45 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 1513, 1513 (2010). 
 106. See, e.g., Ben-Shahar & Logue, supra note 13, at 594 (noting that the passage of HFIAA 
in 2014 with broad bipartisan support was based in part on the idea that actuarial rates “burdened 
lower- and middle class homeowners and small businesses” (quoting 160 Cong. Rec. E309-01 
(Statement of Rep. Castor))).  
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between flood risk and poverty. If it turned out that those paying subsidized 
rates were on average richer than those paying actuarial rates, the argument 
from affordability would be much less compelling, to put it mildly. 
This empirical question has been the subject of intense debate, with 
different studies reaching opposite conclusions.107 Providing a concrete 
answer has always been difficult in part because FEMA does not directly 
collect data on the financial status of its policyholders and in part because 
privacy concerns have prevented it from releasing individualized rate 
information that could be compared against other sources of data, like tax 
returns. Another challenge has been the shadow population of households 
who should carry flood insurance but don’t. 
In April of 2018, FEMA released a comprehensive report (mandated by 
Congress in the passage of HFIAA four years earlier) analyzing the 
affordability problem.108 Using its own internal data on policyholders, FEMA 
was able to match insureds with Census data showing their income and 
extrapolate these matches to the full population of NFIP policyholders, 
obviating the need for many of the creative inferences and data techniques 
relied on in previous studies.109 The report produced many striking findings. 
FEMA found that those living within flood zones tended to have lower 
                                                                                                                                            
 107. See CONG. BUDGET OFFICE, THE NATIONAL FLOOD INSURANCE PROGRAM: FINANCIAL 
SOUNDNESS AND AFFORDABILITY 2 (2017), https://www.cbo.gov/system/files?file=115th-
congress-2017-2018/reports/53028-nfipreport2.pdf [https://perma.cc/NH7V-YCZN] (finding 
that NFIP policyholders tend, on average, “to live in census tracts in which median income is 
somewhat higher than median income averaged across all tracts”); CAMILO SARMIENTO & TED R. 
MILLER, PAC. INST. FOR RESEARCH & EVALUATION, COSTS AND CONSEQUENCES OF FLOODING 
AND THE IMPACT OF THE NATIONAL FLOOD INSURANCE PROGRAM, at xi (2006), 
https://biotech.law.lsu.edu/disasters/insurance/nfip_eval_costs_and_consequences.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/2T5V-LCEM] (finding that “a higher proportion of households in higher 
income brackets own residences in high flood risk areas near coastlines and lakes” but “low 
income households typically live in higher risk areas than middle income households”); Ben-
Shahar & Logue, supra note 13, at 571 (finding “significant regressive redistribution favoring 
affluent homeowners” in study of coastal risk in Florida); Okmyung Bin, John Bishop & Carolyn 
Kousky, Does the National Flood Insurance Program Have Redistributional Effects?, 17 B.E. J. 
ECON. ANALYSIS & POL’Y, no 4, 2007 at 1, 1 (finding that “premiums as a percentage of coverage 
purchased are regressive” but “[p]ayouts . . . as a percentage of coverage purchased, are 
progressive, meaning lower-income zip codes receive a larger portion of claims paid”); Matthew 
E. Kahn & V. Kerry Smith, The Affordability Goal and Prices in the National Flood Insurance 
Program, (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 24120, 2017) (examining flood 
risk along the Gulf coast and concluding that subsidized rates benefit higher income people, 
although this finding varies significantly by state). 
 108. FED. EMERGENCY MGMT. AGENCY, U.S. DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC., AN AFFORDABILITY 
FRAMEWORK FOR THE NATIONAL FLOOD INSURANCE PROGRAM (2018), https://www.fema.gov/
media-library-data/1524056945852-e8db76c696cf3b7f6209e1adc4211af4/Affordability.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/L2ZD-4SLJ].  
 109. Id. at 4. 
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incomes than those living outside of them.110 This gap is even wider if those 
who don’t have flood insurance (but should) are included in the analysis. 
Within flood zones, non-policyholders have lower average incomes than 
policyholders, suggesting that there is a significant population of people who 
choose not to buy flood insurance because they cannot afford it.111 Within 
flood zones, about 26% of NFIP policyholders are “low income.”112 More 
than half—about 51%—of households in flood zones that do not have flood 
insurance are low income.113 Notably, there is a good deal of variation in these 
figures. In a few states, those within flood zones tend to have higher incomes 
than those outside them, and in general those in coastal flood zones tend to 
have higher incomes than those in riverine flood zones.114 FEMA’s analysis, 
thanks in part to its inclusion of households that do not have flood insurance 
but should, demonstrated conclusively that affordability is a major problem 
and that addressing it should be a significant part of any reforms to the 
program. 
On the other hand, the focus on affordability, which could be called the 
redistributional argument against risk classification in flood insurance 
premiums, does little to support the program’s current rate structure. To the 
extent that those who face higher risk have lower incomes, the response has 
always been that affordability should be addressed explicitly rather than with 
the patchwork rate structure that exists today. Affordability is thus seen as a 
concern that supports either a means-tested system for subsidized flood 
insurance premiums or some other form of assistance provided outside the 
NFIP, like a tax credit.  
                                                                                                                                            
 110. Id. at 11. 
 111. See SARMIENTO & MILLER, supra note 107, at 48 (“Moreover, low income homeowners 
generally cannot afford—and therefore lack—flood insurance.”). 
 112. FED. EMERGENCY MGMT. AGENCY, supra note 108, at 6. The report’s income 
calculations are based on HUD definitions and are relative to area median income rather than the 
federal poverty level. Id. at 12; see also UNION OF CONCERNED SCIENTISTS, UNDERWATER: RISING 
SEAS, CHRONIC FLOODS, AND THE IMPLICATIONS FOR U.S. COASTAL REAL ESTATE 10 (2018), 
https://www.ucsusa.org/sites/default/files/attach/2018/06/underwater-analysis-full-report.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/6BSM-K9Y5] (noting that in many states, “60 percent or more of the homes at 
risk of chronic inundation over the next 30 years are valued below the state median” and 
highlighting flood-prone, working class communities in Massachusetts and Oregon). 
 113. FED. EMERGENCY MGMT. AGENCY, supra note 108, at 6. 
 114. See id. at 11, 14. This probably explains why some of the previous studies reached 
different conclusions. Many academic studies examined only particular geographic areas and only 
particular types of risk. Ben-Shahar and Logue, for example, studied only coastal risk in Florida, 
which the FEMA report shows is one of the handful of states where incomes are higher within 
flood zones than outside them. See FED. EMERGENCY MGMT. AGENCY, supra note 107, at 74; Ben-
Shahar & Logue, supra note 13, at 590. In most parts of the country, the opposite is true. 
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The public discourse regarding the NFIP has given short shrift to another 
of the important arguments often used to support cross-subsidies in insurance 
pricing: the “control argument,” which holds that people should not have to 
bear the burden of risk factors over which they have no control. The argument 
could also be framed from the opposite perspective: it is unfair to force low-
risk insureds to subsidize high-risk insureds when the higher risks they face 
are the result of their knowing and voluntary choices. This is a basic moral 
intuition that has had an impact on policy responses to insurance systems and 
risk taking in a whole range of contexts, from smoking to skiing.115 To those 
who support a fully self-sufficient NFIP that charges actuarial rates, this 
argument has powerful rhetorical appeal: people have chosen to expose 
themselves to flood risk, so they should bear the cost of it themselves.116 
That this instinct plays a role in the way we think about flood risk can be 
seen in some of the existing features of the NFIP. The NFIP allows two major 
categories of non-actuarial rates. First, properties that existed before FEMA 
first mapped the risk of flood they faced (which in turn would trigger new 
building codes) are entitled to pay subsidized rates. In part this system was 
designed to attract policyholders to the program when it was first created.117 
It also suggests a judgment that it would be unfair to force people to pay for 
the full magnitude of a risk they didn’t know they faced when they moved 
into their homes. If a property paying such rates is more than 50% damaged 
in a flood, it loses its entitlement to subsidized rates and must be rebuilt in 
compliance with building codes designed to mitigate flood risk, which 
usually means elevating the house.118 The judgment here seems to be similar: 
substantial damage presents the homeowner with a choice, a new opportunity 
to decide whether to invest in a more resilient home and face the risk or 
simply leave. 
The second major category of subsidized rates is paid by properties whose 
risk has increased because of a revision in one of FEMA’s maps. When 
FEMA releases new maps that show a property in a higher risk zone than it 
was before, that property can pay “grandfathered” rates dictated by the old 
map.119 In part, this category of subsidized rates was created to mitigate local 
                                                                                                                                            
 115. See Abraham, supra note 19, at 429; see also Ben-Shahar & Logue, supra note 13, at 
594 (“Actuarial fairness has an intuitive appeal, for example, when differences in risks are the 
result of individuals’ voluntary choices. It seems fair that smokers should pay higher life and 
health insurance premiums than nonsmokers, and that aggressive drivers pay higher auto 
insurance premiums.”). 
 116. See supra note 8 and accompanying text. 
 117. See Pasterick, supra note 29, at 132–34. 
 118. See id. at 144. 
 119. U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, supra note 13, at 7. 
51:0163] ASSUMPTION OF FLOOD RISK 189 
 
opposition to the periodic adoption of revised flood maps120 (which is often, 
nevertheless, quite intense121). But again, the judgment appears to be in part 
a moral one as well: People should be responsible only for the measure of 
risk they chose or, to put it another way, should not be forced to bear the full 
burden of higher rates when FEMA determines that the flood risk they face 
was actually significantly higher than they thought it was when they moved 
in. 
It is thus wrong to assume that the NFIP must necessarily be a fully self-
sustaining program, or that the only way to make it self-sustaining is for each 
individual policyholder to pay full actuarial rates. Indeed, as the Government 
Accountability Office has noted (perhaps critically), the NFIP was “not 
designed to be actuarially sound in the aggregate, nor was it intended to 
generate sufficient funds to fully cover all losses.”122 The NFIP can be 
(indeed, has been) designed to function in part as a subsidy from taxpayers to 
flood victims. It is this subsidy that has made the program deeply 
controversial, but the subsidy’s moral premises have rarely been examined. 
Further, as insurance scholars have noted and as can be seen in other, more 
solidaristic forms of insurance that remain significant today, insurance 
systems can be self-sustaining and include cross-subsidies from various 
classes of policyholders to others. Just as the young subsidize the old when 
buying health insurance, those who pay full-priced rates for flood insurance 
subsidize those who pay discounted rates. The justifiability of the program as 
a system of incentives has been rightly questioned; what has received less 
attention are its moral justifications. 
B. Assumption of Risk 
If the choice to encounter a risk affects where responsibility for that risk 
should lie, what does it mean to choose a risk? It is typically assumed that 
people who are flooded have made a morally significant choice to expose 
themselves to that risk, but there is a difference, long discussed in tort 
doctrine and tort theory, between the purely formal illusion of choice and a 
knowing, free choice sufficient to create responsibility for the realization of 
a risk. By importing a more sophisticated understanding of tort doctrine into 
this admittedly non-tort context, the argument that people living in risky 
locations have assumed the risk of flooding can be evaluated in a more 
                                                                                                                                            
 120. CONG. BUDGET OFFICE, supra note 107, at 16. 
 121. See Sarah Pralle, Drawing Lines: FEMA and the Politics of Mapping Flood Zones 3–4 
(2017) (unpublished manuscript), https://www.maxwell.syr.edu/uploadedFiles/faculty/psc/
Pralle_Drawing%20Lines_APSA2017.pdf [https://perma.cc/KU22-ZAL9]. 
 122. HIGH RISK SERIES, supra note 69, at 619. 
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nuanced way. Looking at the argument in light of tort doctrine on assumption 
of risk suggests many contexts in which it is persuasive—and others in which 
it is not. If tort law represents a distillation and application of our common 
moral intuitions about risk and responsibility, it can shed light on how this 
complex problem should be resolved. 
Tort law adds to the debate two key ideas that have thus far been largely 
absent. First is an insistence on a more nuanced understanding of the concept 
of choice. While early assumption-of-risk cases were content to treat any 
action not literally coerced as an exercise of the plaintiff’s free will, courts in 
the second half of the twentieth century began to understand that economic 
and social pressures could induce someone to remain in a job, say, despite 
being uncomfortable about the hazards they might face there. Second, tort 
law emphasizes the plaintiff’s subjective knowledge of the risk he or she 
faced.123 Only rarely and in limited ways have any of these ideas played a role 
in our discourse regarding flood risk. 
Assumption of risk was introduced to American courts in 1859 with the 
publication of Francis Hilliard’s treatise on tort law.124 While Hilliard tied the 
idea to the relationship between “master” and “servant” in a way that 
suggested applicability only to workplace injuries, the doctrine soon spread 
to other contexts.125 By 1878, a treatise on negligence could describe 
assumption of risk as the expression of the “general principle that a party 
cannot recover for injury he incurs in risks, themselves legitimate, to which 
he intelligently submits himself.”126 
Two famous decisions from the early twentieth century illustrate the 
promise and peril of assumption of risk, and give a sense of why it remains 
                                                                                                                                            
 123. See, e.g., D’Andrea v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 287 A.2d 629, 633 (R.I. 1972) (rejecting 
defendant’s argument that it was entitled to an assumption of risk instruction where plaintiff 
employee “should have known” of the danger of falling off a loading platform because “a plaintiff 
is not deemed to have assumed the risk of conditions of which he is ignorant,” a standard that “is 
subjective and is keyed to what the particular plaintiff in fact sees, knows, understands and 
appreciates” (internal quotations omitted)). But see Murray v. Ramada Inns, Inc., 521 So. 2d 1123, 
1130–31 (La. 1988) (noting that “even as we held that assumption of risk involves a purely 
subjective standard and turns on whether the plaintiff actually knew of the risk, we were willing 
to impute such knowledge to the plaintiff whenever it could be assumed from the given facts that 
he must have known of the danger”). 
 124. See Eric A. Feldman & Alison Stein, Assuming the Risk: Tort Law, Policy, and Politics 
on the Slippery Slope, 59 DEPAUL L. REV. 259, 267 (2010). 
 125. Id. (noting that Hilliard describes the doctrine as holding that “[i]f a defective condition 
‘was known to the servant . . . and the servant continued in the service he assumed the risk 
himself.’”) (quoting 2 FRANCIS HILLIARD, THE LAW OF TORTS, OR PRIVATE WRONGS 467 (3d ed. 
1866)). 
 126. Id. (quoting FRANCIS WHARTON, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF NEGLIGENCE 181 (2d ed. 
1878)). 
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controversial both doctrinally and normatively. Murphy v. Steeplechase 
Amusement Co. involved a young man who had broken his kneecap on a 
Coney Island amusement park ride called “the flopper.”127 In an elegantly 
terse but somewhat cryptic opinion by Judge Cardozo, the New York Court 
of Appeals held that the plaintiff had assumed the risk of being thrown to the 
ground when he stepped onto the ride. He had watched numerous other riders 
suffer the same fate and indeed being thrown to the ground against or at least 
in the company of a lady friend was in a sense the whole point of the 
enterprise.128 “Volenti non fit injuria,”129 Cardozo wrote: 
One who takes part in such a sport accepts the dangers that inhere 
in it so far as they are obvious and necessary . . . . Visitors were 
tumbling about the belt to the merriment of onlookers when he made 
his choice to join them. He took the chance of a like fate, with 
whatever damage to his body might ensue from such a fall. The 
timorous may stay at home.130 
Much of the language in Cardozo’s opinion can be read as holding, 
contrary to the famous quote above, that the company was not in fact 
negligent in designing the ride. The chance of being thrown was part of the 
point, and the canvas pads placed to the side of the belt were adequate 
provision for riders’ safety. There is thus some confusion as to whether the 
opinion is best read as only holding that a plaintiff assumes the risk of an 
activity when the risk is in some sense the very point of the activity (and thus 
not properly described as stemming from any negligence on the part of the 
defendant). This formulation would later be referred to by some courts as 
“primary” assumption of risk, with “secondary” assumption of risk being the 
more expansive idea that a plaintiff who knowingly and voluntarily 
encounters a risk created by the defendant’s negligence is barred from 
recovery.131 Regardless of its precise interpretation as a doctrinal matter, 
Murphy stands out as an expression of a common moral instinct: a person 
                                                                                                                                            
 127. 166 N.E. 173 (N.Y. 1929). 
 128. See id. at 174. The plaintiff, “a vigorous young man,” was at the park with friends and 
had just watched one of them, “a young woman, now his wife,” step onto the belt before him. Id. 
When the belt gave a sudden jerk, the whole group was thrown to the floor. Id. Cardozo opines 
that “[t]he tumbling bodies and the screams and laughter supplied the merriment and fun.” Id. 
 129. “To a willing person it is not a wrong,” i.e., “a person is not wronged by that to which 
he or she consents.” Volenti non fit injuria, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014). 
 130. 166 N.E. at 174. 
 131. See Knight v. Jewett, 834 P.2d 696, 703–04 (Cal. 1992).  
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who knowingly and voluntarily chooses to expose himself to a risk thereby 
accepts responsibility for its realization.132 
The perhaps equally famous Holmes opinion in Lamson v. American 
Axe133 illustrates well why assumption of risk has long been deeply 
controversial. Lamson was an employee of an axe manufacturer who 
expressed concern to his employer about the stability of a rack full of hatchets 
and the safety of working beneath it.134 The response from Lamson’s boss 
was straightforward: “use the racks or leave.”135 Lamson chose not to quit his 
job and, as he feared, was injured by a falling hatchet. Holmes’s two 
paragraph opinion had no difficulty concluding that Lamson “took the risk”: 
“The plaintiff, on his own evidence, appreciated the danger more than anyone 
else. He perfectly understood what was likely to happen.”136 The fact that “the 
fear of losing his place was one of his motives” in staying was dismissed as 
simply irrelevant.137 
Lamson shows how assumption of risk became a key member of the so-
called “unholy trinity” of tort doctrines that served to block recovery by 
workers for workplace injuries in the late nineteenth and early twentieth 
centuries.138 That legacy has made assumption of risk deeply controversial as 
a normative matter. By adopting an expansive conception of “choice” and 
treating the choices made by plaintiffs from all walks of life and in all 
contexts equally, this traditional version of assumption of risk instantiates a 
laissez-faire vision of the world that is “rooted in an unattractive libertarian 
conception of equality.”139 Many have even seen it as a wholly unprincipled 
subsidy to American industry.140 Notably, Holmes’s opinion completely 
                                                                                                                                            
 132. See Feldman & Stein, supra note 124, at 300 (noting the “powerful intuitive appeal to 
the idea that individuals who engage in risky activities should bear the costs of their accidents”). 
 133. Lamson v. Am. Axe & Tool Co., 58 N.E. 585 (Mass. 1900). 
 134. See id. at 585. 
 135. Id.  
 136. Id. 
 137. Id. 
 138. WILLIAM L. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS 526–27 (4th ed. 1971); see 
also LAWRENCE M. FRIEDMAN, A HISTORY OF AMERICAN LAW 470–85 (2d ed. 1985); WITT, supra 
note 85, at 43–70. 
 139. Avihay Dorfman, Assumption of Risk, After All, 15 THEORETICAL INQUIRIES L. 293, 296 
(2014). 
 140. See Tiller v. Atl. Coast Line R.R. Co., 318 U.S. 54, 58–59 (1943) (“Assumption of risk 
is a judicially created rule which was developed in response to the general impulse of common 
law courts at the beginning of [the industrial revolution] to insulate the employer as much as 
possible from bearing the ‘human overhead’ which is an inevitable part of the cost—to 
someone—of the doing of industrialized business. The general purpose behind this development 
in the common law seems to have been to give maximum freedom to expanding industry.”); id. 
at 69 (Frankfurter, J., concurring) (“[T]he phrase ‘assumption of risk’ gave judicial expression to 
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elides the economic context in which Lamson’s choice to keep his job was 
made. For Holmes, the choice to remain in a job was no different from the 
choice to step onto a frivolous ride like the flopper. By treating the choices 
of everyone in every context as equal doctrinally, assumption of risk 
ironically “betray[ed] the basic commitment to the equal concern and respect 
for persons” that is, at least today, usually taken as basic to both tort law and 
our legal system more broadly.141 
Perhaps motivated by the idea that assumption of risk “threatens too much 
libertarianism and too little fairness” (which Avihay Dorfman calls “the deep 
source of the hostility toward the assumption of risk doctrine”),142 scholars 
and judges have long sought to abolish assumption of risk on doctrinal 
grounds as well. One version of this effort focuses on the ways in which 
assumption of risk analysis often feels suspiciously like a substitute for ideas 
concerning duty or breach or comparative negligence. Assumption of risk can 
thus be seen as redundant; instead of saying the plaintiff assumed the risk and 
therefore loses, this critique says, we should be saying that the defendant 
lacked a duty to prevent this particular harm, or that the defendant’s behavior 
did not breach a duty he owed the plaintiff, or that the plaintiff was actually 
negligent in exposing himself to the risk. 
The problem, on this view, is not just that it is unnecessary to talk about 
assumption of risk, but rather that talking about it distracts us from the real 
issues.143 For example, did the Steeplechase Amusement Park in fact operate 
a dangerous ride, or was Murphy’s accident best characterized as a freak 
occurrence not traceable to any breach on the part of the defendant? If the 
problem is that amusement park rides should be reasonably safe, then talking 
about whether Murphy assumed the risk begins to look like a distraction. 
Modern conventional wisdom among torts scholars holds that assumption of 
                                                                                                                                            
a social policy that entailed much human misery.”); Lyons v. Redding Constr. Co., 515 P.2d 821, 
823 (Wash. 1973) (tracing assumption of risk to “[j]udicial protectivism of industrial growth” and 
noting that “[j]udicial recognition that industry should not be nurtured at the expense of human 
suffering was not forthcoming until relatively recently”). 
 141. Dorfman, supra note 139, at 309. Even Francis Bohlen, an early booster of the 
assumption of risk doctrine, sounded a note of caution about its ability to “impose an intolerable 
subjection to fortuitous advantages of superior physical, social, and economic position,” which 
could be “abused to obtain the mere form of consent while the substance of real volition is absent.” 
Francis H. Bohlen, Voluntary Assumption of Risk, 20 HARV. L. REV. 14, 21–22 (1906). 
Nevertheless, Bohlen insisted that “the common law makes no pretence of being a social reformer, 
and does not profess to reduce all persons to an absolutely equal position by eliminating natural 
advantages.” Id. at 22.  
 142. Dorfman, supra note 139, at 308. 
 143. See, e.g., Stephen D. Sugarman, The Monsanto Lecture: Assumption of Risk, 31 VAL. 
U. L. REV. 833 (1997). 
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risk should be abolished as a distinct doctrine and assimilated within 
comparative fault.144 The Third Restatement of Torts favors this approach as 
well, suggesting that the plaintiff’s choice to encounter a risk should be 
treated as relevant only to the question of breach.145 
And yet, assumption of risk remains “firmly embedded in tort law.”146 In 
part there is a narrow doctrinal explanation. There is, technically at least, a 
meaningful distinction between holding that an individual plaintiff 
subjectively appreciated a risk and chose to expose herself to it and a holding 
that relies on notions of duty or reasonable care.147 Indeed, many courts 
applying the doctrine of assumption of risk interpret the subjective 
knowledge requirement quite strictly, rejecting arguments that plaintiffs 
ought to have known of the risk that led to their injury.148 Some courts 
considering the impact of the move from contributory to comparative 
negligence on assumption of risk have thus concluded that assumption of risk 
should continue to operate as a complete bar to a plaintiff’s recovery.149 
                                                                                                                                            
 144. See, e.g., KENNETH S. ABRAHAM, THE FORMS AND FUNCTIONS OF TORT LAW 153 (2d ed. 
2002); DAN B. DOBBS, THE LAW OF TORTS 534–46 (2000); FOWLER V. HARPER ET AL., THE LAW 
OF TORTS § 21.8 (2d ed. 1986); Fleming James Jr., Assumption of Risk, 61 YALE L.J. 141 (1952); 
Sugarman, supra note 143; John W. Wade, The Place of Assumption of Risk in the Law of 
Negligence, 22 LA. L. REV. 5, 14 (1961). 
 145. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: APPORTIONMENT OF LIABILITY § 3 cmt. c (AM. LAW 
INST. 2000). 
 146. Feldman & Stein, supra note 124, at 302. 
 147. See PROSSER, supra note 138, § 68 (insisting that assumption of risk “is a distinctive 
kind of contributory negligence . . . governed by the subjective standard of the plaintiff himself 
[and not] the objective standard of the reasonable man”); Dorfman, supra note 139, at 300; see 
also Poole v. Coakley & Williams Constr., Inc., 31 A.3d 212 (Md. 2011) (distinguishing 
assumption of risk from contributory negligence). 
 148.  See, e.g., Poole, 31 A.3d at 228 (rejecting argument that risk of slipping on black ice 
was obvious to plaintiff crossing a visibly icy parking lot); Hughes v. Omaha Pub. Power Dist., 
735 N.W.2d 793, 810–11 (Neb. 2007) (holding that reasonable jury could conclude that plaintiff 
who was cutting through conduit in an area marked as containing buried electrical lines did not 
have actual knowledge of the danger associated with the particular excavation site in question); 
Pliess v. Barnes, 619 N.W.2d 825, 829–30 (Neb. 2000) (holding that the plaintiff’s admitted 
appreciation of the general risk that ladders could “get shaky and fall down” not sufficient to show 
assumption of risk that aluminum ladder could slide when placed against aluminum gutter); 
Vaughn v. Pleasent, 471 S.E.2d 866, 869 (Ga. 1996) (holding that the plaintiff, a police officer 
engaged in a high-speed pursuit who sped through an intersection in the wrong lane, did not 
thereby assume the risk of a collision. While plaintiff was aware of the general risk of speeding 
through intersections, he was not aware of the specific risk created when defendant, pulling a 
trailer with non-functioning lights, made an unexpected left turn.). 
 149. See, e.g., Smollett v. Skayting Dev. Corp., 793 F.2d 547, 548 (3d Cir. 1986); Kennedy 
v. Providence Hockey Club, Inc., 376 A.2d 329 (R.I. 1977). Other jurisdictions have adopted a 
contrary rule. See, e.g., Li v. Yellow Cab Co., 532 P.2d 1226 (Cal. 1975); McConville v. State 
Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 113 N.W.2d 14 (Wis. 1962). 
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Assumption of risk has also been narrowed significantly since the days of 
Lamson. Today, courts are much more willing to treat as not sufficiently 
“voluntary” choices like the decision to remain in a job.150 
These narrow doctrinal explanations, however, hint at a broader, more 
significant truth: assumption of risk is popular. Contrary to the views of many 
legal scholars and jurists, assumption of risk contains at its core an idea that 
has appealing normative meaning independent of concepts of duty and 
breach.151 Pitched at its highest level of generalization, assumption of risk 
expresses in doctrine the commonsense idea that someone who knowingly 
and freely exposes himself to a risk cannot then complain when that risk is 
realized.152 Framed this way, assumption of risk survives even in jurisdictions 
that have abolished it as a total bar to a plaintiff’s recovery; even under the 
Third Restatement approach, for example, a defendant may still argue that 
the plaintiff’s knowing and freely made choice to encounter a risk diminishes 
the defendant’s own responsibility for the plaintiff’s injury, either because 
the plaintiff’s decision was itself negligent or because it renders the 
defendant’s behavior less so.153  
Nor is assumption of risk the only tort doctrine that hinges on concepts of 
knowledge and choice. Consent, for example, is an affirmative defense to a 
broad range of intentional torts, from battery to trespass to false 
imprisonment.154 Like assumption of risk, consent is built on ideas about 
individuals’ right to autonomy.155 Consent is thus inherently subjective; it is 
irrelevant whether a reasonable person would have consented in similar 
                                                                                                                                            
 150. See Siragusa v. Swedish Hospital, 373 P.2d 767, 773 (Wash. 1962) (“To bar recovery 
when the employee is acting reasonably in exposing himself to a known and appreciated risk is 
to indulge in the unrealistic and rigid presumption that, in so exposing himself, the employee 
‘assents’ to relieve his employer from his responsibility to furnish a safe place in which to work. 
Such a presumption has no basis in experience, and is not founded upon any current social 
policy.”); Kenneth W. Simmons, Reflections on Assumption of Risk, 50 UCLA L. REV. 481, 485 
(2002). 
 151. See John C.P. Goldberg & Benjamin C. Zipursky, Shielding Duty: How Attending to 
Assumption of Risk, Attractive Nuisance, and Other “Quaint” Doctrines Can Improve 
Decisionmaking in Negligence Cases, 79 S. CAL. L. REV. 329 (2006); Simmons, supra note 150, 
at 481, 528. 
 152. See Feldman & Stein, supra note 124, at 300–02 (noting that assumption of risk “has 
withstood decades of criticism because of its resonance with society”). 
 153. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: APPORTIONMENT OF LIABILITY § 3 cmt. c (AM. LAW 
INST. 2000) (“Abandoning implied assumption of risk as a defense does not mean that a plaintiff’s 
actual knowledge of or voluntary decision to encounter a risk is irrelevant to apportioning 
liability.”). 
 154. DOBBS, supra note 144, § 105. 
 155. Id. (noting that consent “makes the plaintiff’s right of self-determination or autonomy 
the centerpiece of the law on intentional torts and to some extent other torts as well”). 
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circumstances.156 Consent is also ineffective to bar recovery if it is based on 
a mistake (for example as a result of a misrepresentation by the defendant)157 
or obtained by duress (for example through an employer’s abuse of his 
position of power of an employee).158 These concepts are analogous to 
assumption of risk’s focus on knowledge and choice. In both cases tort law 
respects the exercise of an individual’s free will to the extent that it is based 
on an accurate understanding of the factual circumstances and is not coerced. 
In addition to surviving as a tort doctrine (and being given effect by 
countless jury decisions), assumption of risk crops up as an argument in 
numerous policy debates outside the realm of tort law. In contexts ranging 
from obesity159 to tobacco160 to the perils of a career playing professional 
football,161 the argument is often made that people should be afforded the 
freedom to expose themselves to various risks, and to live with the 
consequences. The ubiquity of this argument is a sign of its power, and it 
behooves those who are skeptical of it to take it seriously.162 
III. KNOWLEDGE 
For a choice to live somewhere to be a morally significant factor in 
evaluating one’s responsibility for the risks one faces there, that choice must 
be made knowingly, with some particularized awareness of the risk. While 
the current discourse surrounding reform of the NFIP frequently assumes that 
people know the risk of flooding they face, a closer examination reveals that 
this assumption is largely false. Knowledge of risk results from (1) scientific 
understanding of the risk; (2) communication of the scientific understanding 
to individuals; and (3) comprehension on the part of individuals. There are, 
in many cases, nearly insurmountable obstacles at each stage of this process. 
                                                                                                                                            
 156. On the other hand, a plaintiff can consent by words or acts the defendant reasonably 
interpreted to manifest consent, even if the plaintiff did not subjectively intend to consent. Id. 
§ 105. 
 157. Id. § 112.  
 158. Id. § 113. 
 159. See, e.g., Richard A. Epstein, What (Not) To Do About Obesity: A Moderate Aristotelian 
Answer, 93 GEO. L.J. 1361, 1361–62 (2005). 
 160. See, e.g., Jon D. Hanson & Kyle D. Logue, The Costs of Cigarettes: The Economic Case 
for Ex Post Incentive-Based Regulation, 107 YALE L.J. 1163, 1183–86, 1319 (1998) (noting 
prominence of assumption of risk argument in debate over tobacco regulation). 
 161. See, e.g., Mikayla Paolini, Comment, NFL Takes a Page from the Big Tobacco 
Playbook: Assumption of Risk in the CTE Crisis, 68 EMORY L.J. 607, 628–30 (2019). 
 162. Dorfman, supra note 139, at 310–11 (“The challenge for those seeking to invoke the 
law to make our society healthier and safer for all is to engage, rather than dismiss or ignore, the 
conservative instinct for the assumption of risk (moral) principle and (legal) doctrine.”). 
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A. The Science of Flood Risk 
To understand the risk of flood faced by an individual parcel of land is an 
enormously complicated undertaking. It is worth remembering that one 
reason private insurers stopped offering flood insurance in the mid twentieth 
century was that they were simply unable to adequately model the risk.163 
Although the science of hydrology has made enormous progress, scientists 
continue to work to refine their understanding of how a myriad of factors 
come together to affect the flood risk in any particular location, and how those 
factors might change in the future. 
A flood is a combination of water and land, and predicting one requires a 
sophisticated understanding of each. The water that creates a flood can come 
from intense rainfall, coastal storm surge, a river overtopping its banks, or 
any combination of these. How that water impacts the land in question can 
also be determined by a range of factors, including soil composition, local 
topography, development patterns, and the design of any home that is 
affected. Processing all of these factors requires gathering large volumes of 
accurate data, which has proved to be a significant challenge.164 
Flood risk is very much a moving target; each of these factors is subject 
to change, often with devastating effects. In May of 2018, Ellicott City, 
Maryland, was hit by devastating flooding. Thanks to videos taken and posted 
to social media by terrified residents watching from second story windows as 
their downtown turned into a roiling river of brown floodwater, the event 
briefly captured widespread attention.165 To locals, the flood was notable not 
just for its magnitude, but because it was the second 1,000-year flood (a flood 
with a 0.1% chance of occurring in any given year) in three years.166 Ellicott 
City is an old mill town. It was founded in 1772 and has flooded over a dozen 
                                                                                                                                            
 163. See Pasterick, supra note 29, at 128; Scales, supra note 13, at 8. 
 164. See Alexandra Witze, Attack of the Extreme Floods, NATURE (Mar. 7, 2018), 
https://www.nature.com/articles/d41586-018-02745-0 [https://perma.cc/AS9M-T2WW] 
(describing efforts by scientists to gather data on flood risk, including need to manually collect 
and digitize documents that predate the start of modern NOAA records in 1921); see also Maggie 
Koerth-Baker, It’s Time To Ditch the Concept of ‘100-Year Floods,’ FIVETHIRTYEIGHT (Aug. 30, 
2017), https://fivethirtyeight.com/features/its-time-to-ditch-the-concept-of-100-year-floods/ 
[https://perma.cc/N8TM-22DV] (noting that much of the stream gauge data on which estimates 
of Houston’s flood risk is based only goes back a few decades). 
 165. See Henry Grabar, The Maryland Flooding Is a Warning: Climate Change Is Hitting 
America as Rain, and We’re Making It Worse, SLATE (May 29, 2018), https://slate.com/news-
and-politics/2018/05/ellicott-city-maryland-flooding-climate-change-is-coming-as-rain.html 
[https://perma.cc/J4XW-ARLQ]. 
 166. Id. That this is startling is, in part, a perfect illustration of the problem of describing 
flood events by their “return interval,” which tends to create an impression that a 1,000-year flood 
should happen only once in 1,000 years. 
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times since then. The source of its floodwaters has historically been the 
Patapsco River, which flows into Baltimore and forms its harbor. The flood 
events of 2016 and 2018, however, resulted from flash floods on the Tiber 
River, a small tributary of the Patapsco that flows through Ellicott City. The 
surrounding area has seen widespread development in recent years, which 
has covered absorbent soil with asphalt and created a flash flooding problem 
that most agree is new.167 
The flooding in Ellicott City points to another significant challenge in the 
scientific understanding of flood risk: the role of climate change. Ellicott 
City’s flooding was caused by a brief but intense period of rainfall, one of 
several sources of flooding that climate change is expected to exacerbate. 
Warmer air holds more moisture, which can cause heavier rainfall. The 
number of extreme precipitation events in the United States has been well 
above average for the past three decades, a trend that is expected to 
continue.168 Understanding how these broad trends apply to any given place 
in the United States is much more challenging. The first volume of the Fourth 
National Climate Assessment notes that the observed national increase in 
extreme precipitation masks significant regional and seasonal variations: the 
Pacific Northwest has seen a slight decrease in extreme rainfall, while the 
eastern half of the country has seen large increases.169 Projecting these trends 
into the future, the Climate Assessment notes, is “much more difficult.”170 
While the global mechanisms are fairly well understood, how they will play 
out in a particular region is a matter of uncertainty.171 The degree of 
uncertainty is worth emphasizing. How much increase in extreme 
precipitation events is expected over the coming century depends on trends 
in carbon emissions during that period, itself a matter of significant 
uncertainty.172 If carbon emissions continue to increase, the number of 
extreme rainfall events in the United States could increase by anywhere from 
                                                                                                                                            
 167. See id.; Luke Broadwater, Scott Dance & Pamela Wood, After Deadly Flash Flood, 
Concern About Development’s Impact on Ellicott City, BALT. SUN (Aug. 13, 2016), 
http://www.baltimoresun.com/news/maryland/howard/ellicott-city/bs-md-ho-ellicott-city-
development-20160813-story.html [https://perma.cc/A36J-A9XR]. Nowhere is this dynamic 
more pronounced than in Houston. Satija, Collier & Shaw, supra note 5. 
 168. 1 U.S. GLOB. CLIMATE CHANGE RESEARCH PROGRAM, CLIMATE SCIENCE SPECIAL 
REPORT: THE FOURTH NATIONAL CLIMATE ASSESSMENT 210, 216 (Donald J. Wuebbles, David 
W. Fahey & Kathy W. Hibbard eds., 2017), https://science2017.globalchange.gov/downloads/
CSSR2017_FullReport.pdf [https://perma.cc/JB69-K6MS]. 
 169. Id. at 210–13. 
 170. Id. at 216. 
 171. Id. 
 172. Id. at 14, 218. 
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100 to 200%.173 Under a lower emissions scenario, increases could be 
between 50 and 100%, again with significant regional variation.174 
A far more significant way in which climate change will increase flood 
risk is sea level rise. A higher global sea level will worsen periodic flooding 
from storm surges, so-called “nuisance” flooding that occurs during high 
tides, and finally, in some areas, lead to complete inundation. Rising sea 
levels are frequently assumed to present an obvious and unmistakable risk for 
those in coastal areas, but here again the risk is characterized by complexity 
and variability that makes its application to individual properties challenging. 
The scientific understanding of how rising sea levels will affect flood risk 
must start with a basic question: how much will global sea levels increase? 
Translating degrees of warming in the earth’s climate into increases in global 
mean sea level requires starting with assumptions about how much warming 
will occur. The national climate assessment bases its analysis on the amount 
of warming that will occur by 2100 under four possible scenarios: a 
pessimistic scenario in which emissions continue at current rates, and three 
more optimistic scenarios that assume varying degrees of reduction in 
emissions at various times.175 Under these scenarios, which were generated 
for the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, warming could range 
from as little as 0.6 to 2.4 degrees Celsius under the lowest scenario to as 
much as 2.8 to 5.7 degrees Celsius under the highest scenario.176 
These ranges translate into similarly broad ranges of possible increases in 
global sea levels.177 The fourth national climate assessment predicts that 
global mean sea level will rise by at least a foot by 2100, and goes on to note 
that under a high emissions scenario, global sea levels could rise by as much 
as eight feet, but that “the probability of such an extreme outcome cannot 
currently be assessed.”178 
Increases in global mean sea level do not translate into uniform increases 
in regional sea levels. Regional sea level is affected by a range of factors, 
                                                                                                                                            
 173. Id. at 218. 
 174. Id. 
 175. Id. at 16. 
 176. Id. These estimates have generated intense debate. Many scientists believe they are too 
low. The former chair of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, Robert Watson, has 
said that warming of three degrees should be considered the “realistic minimum.” Nathaniel Rich, 
Losing Earth: The Decade We Almost Stopped Climate Change, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 1, 2018), 
https://nyti.ms/2mWMDT8 [https://perma.cc/4CFT-JUAN]. 
 177. See UNION OF CONCERNED SCIENTISTS, supra note 112, at 11 (“The difference in 
impacts to real estate between high and low sea level rise scenarios is stark.”). 
 178. U.S. GLOB. CLIMATE CHANGE RESEARCH PROGRAM, supra note 168, at 333. 
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including global ocean currents and land subsidence.179 While this introduces 
further uncertainty into localized predictions (for example, the Gulf Stream 
has been weakening and could collapse entirely, significantly worsening sea 
level rise along the East Coast),180 it is so far clear that much of the east and 
Gulf coasts of the United States will experience sea level rise worse than 
global averages.181 Indeed, this trend has already begun and has been 
observed in local data.182 
Such is the current state of scientific understanding of how climate change 
will affect flood risk in the United States.183 It will certainly worsen the risk 
of flooding in most areas, but to highly varying degrees depending on factors 
ranging from global efforts to curb carbon emissions to local groundwater 
extraction and land use patterns. 
B. FEMA’s Understanding of Flood Risk 
FEMA’s understanding of flood risk is what matters for purposes of the 
NFIP, and it diverges from what might be called the best scientific 
understanding in a variety of ways. First and perhaps most glaringly, FEMA’s 
estimates of flood risk are exclusively backwards-looking. In other words, 
FEMA does not account for projections of future increases in rainfall or sea 
level in evaluating flood risk. It also doesn’t factor in future land subsidence 
or development. In FEMA’s most recent report to Congress, this is listed as 
a long term, “10+ year[]” goal.184 FEMA is also cautious about incorporating 
new data and new modelling techniques into its assessments of flood risk, 
which inevitably leaves it trailing behind the latest science. One recent study, 
                                                                                                                                            
 179. Id. at 335. In some areas, the earth’s crust is still moving upwards (“rebounding”) after 
being relieved of the weight of the ice sheets that rested on it during the last ice age. In other 
areas, land deposited by glaciers is still subsiding. 
 180. Id. at 335, 346. 
 181. Id.  
 182. Id. at 347. 
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the task of understanding how an individual property’s flood risk will change over the coming 
century necessarily imprecise. 
 184. DEP’T. OF HOMELAND SEC., FEMA REPORT TO CONGRESS ON THE TECHNICAL MAPPING 
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for example, noted that FEMA assesses the risk of freshwater and saltwater 
flooding as entirely independent variables, when in fact they often appear 
together, as happens during hurricanes.185 
Perhaps even more significantly, FEMA’s flood maps are appallingly old, 
and out of date even by its own internal yardstick. Keeping detailed flood 
maps of the entire country up to date has been a challenge that has bedeviled 
FEMA for years. In the National Flood Insurance Reform Act of 1994, 
Congress required FEMA to assess each of its flood maps every five years 
and determine whether each map is in need of revision. In 2009, FEMA set 
itself a goal ensuring that 80% of its maps were either revised and updated or 
determined to be accurate by 2014. Instead only 49% of its maps met this 
standard by 2014. A 2017 report by the Department of Homeland Security’s 
Inspector General revealed that by the end of December 2016, only 42% of 
FEMA’s maps were up to date.186 
In many parts of the country, including parts that are at high risk of 
flooding, maps are decades old.187 Beaufort and Hilton Head, South Carolina, 
have not had new flood maps since 1986. Parts of the Texas Gulf Coast near 
Houston and Galveston have not had new maps since the early 1990s.188 
Atlantic City, New Jersey, which is already experiencing regular nuisance 
flooding due to rising sea levels,189 has not had a new flood map since 1985.190 
In many areas the difference between old and new maps is significant: flood 
maps for Jackson County, Mississippi, (along the Gulf Coast) show water 
depths during a 100-year flood as much as fourteen feet higher than older 
                                                                                                                                            
 185. See Jen Schwartz, National Flood Insurance Program Is Underwater Because of 
Outdated Science, SCI. AM. (Mar. 23, 2018), https://www.scientificamerican.com/article/
national-flood-insurance-is-underwater-because-of-outdated-science [https://perma.cc/W9RL-
SAHB].  
 186. OFFICE OF THE INSPECTOR GEN., U.S. DEP’T. OF HOMELAND SEC., OIG-17-110, FEMA 
NEEDS TO IMPROVE MANAGEMENT OF ITS FLOOD MAPPING PROGRAMS 3 (2017), 
https://www.oig.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/assets/2017/OIG-17-110-Sep17.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/F2XN-XDF4].  
 187. See Michael Keller et al., Outdated and Unreliable: FEMA’s Faulty Flood Maps Put 




 188. Id. 
 189. Michael Edison Hayden, Atlantic City Gambles on Rising Seas, NAT’L GEOGRAPHIC 
(May 4, 2016), http://news.nationalgeographic.com/2016/05/160502-rising-seas-climate-change-
atlantic-city [https://perma.cc/C95N-KVJ4]. 
 190. FEMA Flood Map Service Center for Atlantic City, New Jersey, FEMA, 
https://msc.fema.gov/portal/search (search in search bar for “Atlantic City, New Jersey”) (last 
visited Mar. 3, 2019).  
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maps in neighboring Mobile County, Alabama.191 The problem is not just 
inaccurate depth; new maps might also show thousands of properties at risk 
of flooding for the first time.192 
FEMA’s outdated approach to the science of flood risk and inability to 
keep its maps current have resulted in a significant underestimation of the 
risk of flooding in many areas. Anecdotally, it has become commonplace to 
hear of virtually back-to-back occurrences of floods with 500- or 1,000-year 
return intervals.193 One study examined properties that had flooded repeatedly 
in Houston during the 30-year period from 1978 to 2008 and found that 
almost half of them—47%—were located outside the 100-year flood zone.194 
Large scale national evaluations have lent further support to the idea that 
FEMA’s maps understate the risk. One recent study used newer, higher-
resolution data to evaluate from scratch the risk of flooding caused by rainfall 
in the contiguous United States. The authors found that FEMA’s maps 
significantly underestimate the risk: FEMA’s maps show thirteen million 
Americans living in 100-year flood zones, while the authors’ analysis 
suggests the number should be 40.8 million.195 There were similarly large 
discrepancies in the total property value at risk, and the authors projected—
using estimates of population growth but not the effects of climate change—
that the problem is getting worse.196 
C. Communicating Flood Risk 
For individuals to have meaningful knowledge of the flood risk they face, 
the scientific and regulatory understanding of that risk (such as it is) must be 
                                                                                                                                            
 191. Keller et al., supra note 187.  
 192. Id. In many cases, being re-mapped into a flood zone means being subject to the NFIP’s 
purchase mandate for the first time, creating a financial burden that generates intense local 
opposition to new flood maps. See Pralle, supra note 121, at 15. 
 193. In Houston, for example, the “Tax Day” and “Memorial Day” floods of 2016 and 
Hurricane Harvey in 2017 all featured rainfall currently estimated to have only a 0.2% chance of 
occurring in any given year (a so-called “500-year” event). Spring Floods 2016, HARRIS COUNTY 
FLOOD CONTROL DISTRICT (Feb. 21, 2018), https://www.hcfcd.org/flooding-floodplains/storm-
center/spring-floods-2016 [https://perma.cc/S2Y7-R7ZK]; Memorandum from Jeff Linder, Dir. 
Hydrologic Operations/Meteorologist, to Harris Cty. Flood Control Dist. Flood Watch/Partners 3 
(June 4, 2018), https://www.hcfcd.org/media/2678/immediate-flood-report-final-hurricane-
harvey-2017.pdf [https://perma.cc/D9GH-98DX]. 
 194. Wesley E. Highfield, Sarah A. Norman & Samuel D. Brody, Examining the 100-Year 
Floodplain as a Metric of Risk, Loss, and Household Adjustment, 33 RISK ANALYSIS 186, 189 
(2012). 
 195. Oliver E.J. Wing et al., Estimates of Present and Future Flood Risk in the Conterminous 
United States, 13 ENVTL. RES. LETTERS 1, 3 (2018). 
 196. Id. at 5. 
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available to them in some way. The primary mechanism by which flood risk 
is communicated is through FEMA’s maps, and the job they do is poor. 
Much of the information in FEMA’s maps (known as “Flood Insurance 
Rate Maps” or “FIRMs”) is built on the statistical construct known as a 100-
year flood.197 Within the 100-year flood zone (known as the “Special Flood 
Hazard Area”), FIRMs show the expected depth of the water above 
surrounding grade (the “base flood elevation”).198 FIRMs also show which 
areas are expected to flood during 500-year events, but not the depth of water 
during such episodes.199 They do not show the effects of more severe (and 
therefore less likely) events. In coastal areas, FIRMs also depict areas that are 
expected to be subject to wave action during floods, which is potentially far 
more destructive.200 The Special Flood Hazard Area is the most important 
designation in a FIRM: within it, the NFIP’s purchase mandate applies, as do 
local building codes that require new and substantially damaged homes to be 
built above base flood elevation.201 
The concept of the 100-year flood has long been the subject of intense 
criticism.202 Even setting aside issues surrounding the accuracy of FEMA’s 
determinations of what constitutes a 100-year flood, there are problems with 
relying on such a construct in the first place. For those within the 100-year 
flood zone, the term creates the misimpression that floods should happen only 
once every 100 years, and that the occurrence of one means that the next is 
99 years away.203 FEMA has for many years battled valiantly to combat this 
                                                                                                                                            
 197. FED. EMERGENCY MGMT. AGENCY, TECHNICAL FACT SHEET NO. 3, USING A FLOOD 
INSURANCE RATE MAP (FIRM): HOME BUILDER’S GUIDE TO COASTAL CONSTRUCTION 1 
http://www.flash.org/resources/files/HGCC_Fact03.pdf [https://perma.cc/65F8-759L]. 
 198. FEMA Flood Map Service Center: FAQs, FED. EMERGENCY MGMT. AGENCY, 
https://msc.fema.gov/portal/resources/faq [https://perma.cc/UW6Z-9FTS] (last visited Jan. 25, 
2019). 
 199. See FED. EMERGENCY MGMT. AGENCY, HOW TO READ A FLOOD INSURANCE RATE MAP 
TUTORIAL (2003) https://www.fema.gov/media-library-data/20130726-1550-20490-1950/
ot_firm.pdf [https://perma.cc/2WYX-NMBV]. 
 200. Id. 
 201. Id. 
 202. See, e.g., Highfield, Norman & Brody, supra note 194, at 186 (“[T]he 100-year 
floodplain is neither accurate nor sufficient in guiding communities and household decisions to 
mitigate the adverse economic impacts of floods.”); Koerth-Baker, supra note 164 (calling the 
100-year flood “one of the most misunderstood terms in disaster preparedness”). 
 203. See, e.g., Scales, supra note 13, at 9 (“What the average person actually 
understands . . . is that once there has already been such a flood in his area, he is safe for the next 
ninety-nine years.”); see also Nadja Popovich & Claire O’Neill, A ‘500-Year Flood’ Could 
Happen Again Sooner Than You Think. Here’s Why, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 28, 2017), 
https://nyti.ms/2vEVM4y [https://perma.cc/459R-P3NC] (noting tweet from Donald Trump 
referring to Harvey as “a once in 500 year flood”). 
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misimpression (preferring now to speak of the 26% chance of a flood 
occurring over the course of a 30-year mortgage, for example), but it persists. 
One of the many cognitive biases affecting perception of flood risk is the 
belief that long-term averages will be replicated in short samples of data. So, 
for example, people significantly underestimate the odds of getting heads 
four times in a row when flipping a coin or, having been told that a flood was 
caused by a 100-year storm, the odds that it will happen again the following 
year.204 
For those outside the 100-year floodplain, the problems with the construct 
are more severe. Being outside the Special Flood Hazard Area and therefore 
not obligated to purchase flood insurance is understood by many as meaning 
that flood risk is not a significant problem.205 More than half the homes 
damaged by Hurricane Harvey—more than 100,000 in number—were 
outside of all floodplain designations.206 To many who lived outside FEMA-
designated floodplains and yet were flooded by Harvey, the fact that their 
homes were capable of being flooded came as a shock.207 In the Houston 
suburb The Woodlands, the bright lines demarcating NFIP flood zones 
incentivized gamesmanship, with developers trucking in tens of thousands of 
cubic yards of dirt to build homes that were literally inches above base flood 
elevation and thus not required to buy flood insurance, most of which flooded 
during Harvey.208 Notably, although Harvey was an unprecedented storm in 
many respects,209 it was not unique in the recent history of the Houston area. 
                                                                                                                                            
 204. Robert J. Meyer, Why We Under-Prepare for Hazards, in ON RISK AND DISASTER: 
LESSONS FROM HURRICANE KATRINA, 153, 160 (Ronald J. Daniels, Donald F. Kettl & Howard 
Kunreuther eds., 2006). 
 205. See CTR. FOR DISASTER RESILIENCE, UNIV. OF MD. & CTR. FOR TEX. BEACHES & 
SHORES, TEX. A&M UNIV., THE GROWING THREAT OF URBAN FLOODING: A NATIONAL 
CHALLENGE 35 (2018) [hereinafter URBAN FLOODING], https://cdr.umd.edu/sites/cdr.umd.edu/
files/urban-flooding-report-online-revised.pdf [https://perma.cc/A4LV-YG4L] (noting that 
FIRMs “have . . . been incorrectly seen as tools to communicate basic flood risk—property is 
subject to flooding (in the SFHA) or not (outside the SFHA)”).  
 206. David Hunn et al., Harvey’s Floods: Most Homes Damaged by Harvey Were Outside 
Flood Plain, Data Show, HOUS. CHRON. (Mar. 30, 2018), https://www.houstonchronicle.com/
news/article/In-Harvey-s-deluge-most-damaged-homes-were-12794820.php 
[https://perma.cc/K9DD-2DNV]. 
 207. Id. 
 208. John Schwartz, James Glanz & Andrew W. Lehren, Builders Said Their Homes Were 
Out of a Flood Zone. Then Harvey Came, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 2, 2017), https://nyti.ms/2BCdrON 
[https://perma.cc/DN4S-JNVF].  
 209. The National Weather Service called Harvey “the most significant tropical cyclone 
rainfall event in . . . United States history since reliable rainfall records began in the 1880s.” 
Donovan Landreneau, Hurricane Harvey, NAT’L WEATHER SERV., https://www.weather.gov/lch/
2017harvey [https://perma.cc/6K4Y-LHDJ] (last visited Jan. 25, 2019). 
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Harvey set flood records in only thirteen of Harris County’s twenty-two 
watersheds, several of which experienced higher water levels during Tropical 
Storm Allison in 2001.210 The Tax Day floods in 2016 saw a similar pattern: 
more than half the structures damaged were outside the 100-year 
floodplain.211 
Using the 100-year flood zone as the fulcrum of the NFIP implies a bright 
line between those at risk and those who need not worry about flooding, and 
this bright line is reflected in NFIP participation rates. Participation rates in 
the NFIP have always been disappointing, in part because the program’s 
purchase mandate is woefully underenforced.212 Relatively few of those 
living outside FEMA’s 100-year floodplain choose to purchase flood 
insurance.213 Nationally, the NFIP’s market penetration outside Special Flood 
Hazard Areas has been estimated at 1%.214 It is hard to know how many of 
those households should purchase flood insurance, given the wide range of 
flood risk that can be found in areas outside FEMA-designated Special Flood 
Hazard Areas. Comparing the number of NFIP policies in effect with 
independent estimates of the number of households at risk of flooding gives 
some sense of the problem. According to one study, which found that 
FEMA’s 100-year flood zones were far too small, there are 15.4 million 
homes located in 100-year flood zones across the country,215 while there are 
only about 4.8 million flood insurance policies for residential properties 
currently in force.216 
More anecdotally, virtually every significant flood is followed by the 
revelation that only a relatively small percentage of those flooded were 
insured. In Harris County, which has 1.7 million housing units, there were 
just 249,000 flood insurance policies in place before Harvey; it has been 
                                                                                                                                            
 210. See Zach Despart, Funding Gap Post-Harvey Shows Need for Better Flood Maps, HOUS. 
CHRON. (June 7, 2018), https://www.pressreader.com/usa/houston-chronicle/20180607/
281573766389961; Memorandum from Jeff Linder, supra note 193, at 4–7. 
 211. Hunn et al., supra note 206. 
 212. Enforcement of the purchase mandate is not FEMA’s responsibility; rather, it is left up 
to the regulator with oversight of the lender in question. Compliance with the lender mandate has 
been estimated at between 75 and 80% nationally, with significant local variation. LLOYD DIXON 
ET AL., RAND CORP., THE NATIONAL FLOOD INSURANCE PROGRAM’S MARKET PENETRATION 
RATE: ESTIMATES AND POLICY IMPLICATIONS, at xvii, 2 n.5 (2006), https://www.fema.gov/media-
library-data/20130726-1602-20490-2804/nfip_eval_market_penetration_rate.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/MBJ3-D2FB]. 
 213. Id. at xviii. 
 214. Id. at xvi. 
 215. Wing et al., supra note 195, at 5. 
 216. Policies in Force by Occupancy Type, FED. EMERGENCY MGMT. AGENCY, 
https://www.fema.gov/policies-force-occupancy-type [https://perma.cc/X6ZZ-A9S9] (last 
visited Mar. 4, 2019). 
206 ARIZONA STATE LAW JOURNAL [Ariz. St. L.J. 
 
estimated that about 70% of the residential flood damage caused by Harvey 
was not covered by insurance.217 Similar figures emerged in various parts of 
the Gulf Coast that were devastated by Hurricane Katrina.218 Only 20% of 
those flooded by Hurricane Sandy had flood insurance.219 Of the 57,923 
households that suffered the worst categories of damage in flooding caused 
by extreme rainfall in Louisiana in 2016, only 37% had flood insurance.220 At 
least part of the blame for this state of affairs lies in the fact that many simply 
do not know that they are at risk of being flooded. 
Various empirical studies have attempted to measure more directly what 
people understand about their risk of flooding. They have commonly found 
that people, when asked, did not know that they lived in flood-prone areas.221 
One study found that most people (64%) were unable to locate their own 
homes on maps showing hurricane risk areas.222 In another, researchers 
interviewed people living in the paths of Hurricanes Sandy and Isaac in the 
days and hours before those storms made landfall.223 The study’s authors 
                                                                                                                                            
 217. Leslie Scism & Nicole Friedman, Houston Residents Return Home to Scary Reality: No 
Insurance Coverage, WALL ST. J. (Sept. 1, 2017, 8:32 PM), 
https://www.wsj.com/articles/houston-residents-return-home-to-scary-reality-no-insurance-
coverage-1504300222 [https://perma.cc/M4QY-PF7W]; see also Nicole Friedman & Leslie 
Scism, As Hurricane Season Arrives, U.S. Homeowners Haven’t Fixed Their Big Underinsurance 
Problem, WALL ST. J. (July 18, 2018, 6:45 PM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/american-
homeowners-still-have-a-big-underinsurance-problem-1531922482 [https://perma.cc/XQ75-
AHUK]. 
 218. Along the Gulf Coast of Mississippi, which was virtually wiped out by storm surges, 
less than 10% of homes had flood insurance. Scales, supra note 13, at 15. In St. Bernard Parish, 
57.7% of homes had flood insurance. Robert H. Jerry, II & Steven E. Roberts, Regulating the 
Business of Insurance: Federalism in an Age of Difficult Risk, 41 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 835, 877 
(2006). In Orleans Parish, only 40% of homes had flood insurance. Id. 
 219.  David W. Chen, In New York, Drawing Flood Maps Is a ‘Game of Inches,’ N.Y. TIMES 
(Jan. 7, 2018), https://nyti.ms/2EkURv7 [https://perma.cc/6CRM-NUQT]. 
 220.  Bryn Stole, How Much Damage Did the August 2016 Flood Do? Data Becomes Clearer, 
but Gaps Remain, ADVOCATE (Aug. 7, 2017, 6:56 PM), 
https://www.theadvocate.com/louisiana_flood_2016/article_66d26396-7974-11e7-ba41-
83143d6dfef1.html [https://perma.cc/RDR7-WHB2]. 
 221.  URBAN FLOODING, supra note 205, at 34 (“A majority of residents in urban flood-prone 
areas generally do not understand the actual risks . . . that they face from urban flooding. . . . 
Numerous federal reports over the last decade have indicated that miscommunication is a 
significant challenge in all types of flooding.”).  
 222.  Sudha Arlikatti et al., Risk Area Accuracy and Hurricane Evacuation Expectations of 
Coastal Residents, 38 ENV’T & BEHAV. 226, 239 (2006). 
 223.  See Robert J. Meyer et al., The Dynamics of Hurricane Risk Perception: Real-Time 
Evidence from the 2012 Atlantic Hurricane Season, 95 BULL. AM. METEOROLOGICAL SOC’Y 
1389, 1390 (2014). There is a rich body of literature examining communication of risk 
surrounding shorter term events, like hurricanes. That literature has tended to highlight the 
shortcomings of the way we communicate about the risks of coming storms, and particularly the 
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noted that respondents displayed a prominent bias in favor of wind risk and 
against flood risk, consistently underestimating the threat posed by storm 
surge and flooding.224 
What of those who have already been flooded? Surely the experience of 
seeing one’s house underwater creates the requisite knowledge that one is 
facing some quantum of flood risk.225 Indeed, so-called “repetitive loss 
properties,” a category FEMA defines as those that have had two or more 
claims of $10,000 or more in ten years, have become a poster child for 
irresponsibility.226 Egregious examples make frequent appearances in the 
popular press.227 By eliminating certain rates and imposing new adaptation 
requirements on homes that are more than 50% damaged in a flood, the NFIP 
does treat the experience of being flooded as a significant turning point. And 
                                                                                                                                            
apparent failure of risk communications to motivate people to take relatively simple precautions 
like evacuating in the face of a storm or installing storm shutters over their windows. 
 224.  Id. at 1394. Notably, the study also found that while 42% of respondents indicated that 
they had flood insurance, only 51% said they had a separate flood insurance policy, indicating 
that fully half of respondents who thought they had flood insurance were not in fact covered. Id. 
at 1400. Similar problems have been observed in other areas. LLOYD DIXON ET AL., RAND CORP., 
THE COST AND AFFORDABILITY OF FLOOD INSURANCE IN NEW YORK CITY 18 (2017), 
https://www.rand.org/pubs/research_reports/RR1776.html [https://perma.cc/6TYK-GKMX] 
(finding in a survey of New Yorkers post-Sandy, that 16% of homeowners believed they had 
flood insurance but did not). 
 225.  See Caroline Kelly, Hensarling to Flood Victims: ‘At Some Point, God’s Telling You to 
Move,’ DALL. MORNING NEWS (Sept. 21, 2017), https://www.dallasnews.com/news/
harvey/2017/09/21/hensarling-flood-victims-point-gods-telling-move [https://perma.cc/HHV6-
FDWP] (reporting remarks of Congressman Jeb Hensarling). 
 226.  In 2004, John Stossel, a television host formerly of Fox News, wrote a notorious essay 
about buying flood insurance on his new beachfront vacation home entitled Confessions of a 
Welfare Queen. John Stossel, Confessions of a Welfare Queen: How Rich Bastards Like Me Rip 
Off Taxpayers for Millions of Dollars, REASON (Mar. 1, 2004), http://reason.com/archives/
2004/03/01/confessions-of-a-welfare-queen [https://perma.cc/8AD9-TLA9]. The examples I 
have in mind are more prosaic. See infra note 227. 
 227.  Virtually every story about the woes of the National Flood Insurance Program features 
jarring examples prominently. See, e.g., Michael Grunwald, How Washington Made Harvey 
Worse, POLITICO (Aug. 29, 2017), https://www.politico.com/magazine/story/2017/08/29/a-
storm-made-in-washington-215549 [https://perma.cc/UN24-JCL3] (citing home valued at less 
than $115,000 that has flooded sixteen times in eighteen years, resulting in $800,000 in claims); 
Noel King, National Flood Insurance Program Will Pay Out Billions for a Few Properties, NPR 
(Nov. 21, 2017, 4:45 PM), https://www.npr.org/2017/09/21/552708255/national-flood-
insurance-program-will-pay-out-billions-for-a-few-properties [https://perma.cc/22X7-MXWP] 
(reporting a home that cost $83,000 in 1992 and has received $700,000 in claims payments since 
2009); Eric Lipton, Felicity Barringer & Mary Williams Walsh, Flood Insurance, Already 
Fragile, Faces New Stress, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 12, 2012), https://nyti.ms/2vwAVR5 
[https://perma.cc/K6Y9-BMJT] (citing homes in Biloxi, Mississippi, and Humble, Texas, that— 
despite being worth $183,000 and $116,000, respectively—have received $1.47 million and $2 
million in claims payments from the NFIP). 
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it is certainly true that more could be done to address the problem. Indeed, 
many of those who have been flooded repeatedly express interest in being 
bought out and relocating.228 
But even when a flood has happened, the knowledge it creates about flood 
risk going forward is often amorphous.229 One study attempted to measure 
“whether a severe flood causes homeowners to update their assessment of 
flood risk” by looking at changes in property values in St. Louis County 
following the severe flooding there in 1993.230 The study concluded that 
property values in 100-year floodplains were not affected to a statistically 
significant degree by the flooding, suggesting that the market had already 
been aware of the flood risk and priced it in.231 Prices did fall in 500-year 
floodplains, and in communities along the Missouri and Mississippi rivers 
generally, implying that the real estate market was capitalizing new 
information about flood risk.232 
The task of communicating flood risk to non-experts with enough 
precision and urgency to induce them to take relatively simple steps like 
buying flood insurance has proved so challenging that many experts have 
concluded that simple messages are most effective. Reflecting on Hurricane 
Irma’s impact in Florida, Roy Wright—until recently the Director of the 
NFIP—said that people should pay less attention to flood maps: “We really 
gotta help people move beyond and quit focusing on the lines,” he told the 
Miami Herald.233 Instead, he suggested, everyone living in Florida should 
consider themselves at risk, and buy flood insurance.234 Others have echoed 
the sentiment.235 
                                                                                                                                            
 228.  See Michael Kimmelman, Lessons from Hurricane Harvey: Houston’s Struggle Is 
America’s Tale, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 11, 2017), https://nyti.ms/2jh20r1 [https://perma.cc/CH97-
RJ6H] (profiling several homeowners “hoping for a buyout”). 
 229.  Statistically, the occurrence of an event with a 0.1% chance of occurring should tell us 
nothing about the chance of a similar event occurring in the following year. Realistically, on the 
other hand, such an event may lead to a significant recalculation of the odds of similar storms, in 
a field in which estimates are based on roughly a century of data at best. 
 230.  Carolyn Kousky, Learning from Extreme Events: Risk Perceptions after the Flood, 86 
LAND ECON. 395, 395 (2010). 
 231.  Id. at 415–17. 
 232.  Id. at 417–18. 
 233.  Jenny Staletovich, America’s Flood Insurance Chief Has a Message for All Floridians: 
You’re at Risk, MIAMI HERALD (Mar. 5, 2018, 6:51 PM), https://www.miamiherald.com/news/
weather/hurricane/article203631769.html [https://perma.cc/6D4G-BXZZ]. 
 234. Id.  
 235.  Brian K. Sullivan, ‘100-Year Floods’ Happen More Often Than People Think, INS. J. 
(Apr. 22, 2016), https://www.insurancejournal.com/news/national/2016/04/22/406148.htm 
[https://perma.cc/6HSJ-7SQQ] (“If you live in Houston, buy flood insurance.”). 
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Ideally, flood insurance premiums themselves would be an effective way 
to communicate the risk of flooding. This is, after all, one of the ways in 
which risk-rated premiums are said to help combat moral hazard, by 
translating the often difficult to quantify risks people take into dollars and 
cents. Subsidized flood insurance premiums have thus created a sort of 
vicious cycle: They mask the true risk people face, lulling them into a false 
sense of security while also undermining the argument that they knew what 
they were getting into and thus do not deserve financial support. This is a 
hard cycle to break, because any change in the structure of subsidized rates 
can have enormous impacts on the people who have benefited from them in 
the past. 
The experience of New York City during and after Hurricane Sandy 
illustrates many of these problems. Before Sandy, New York’s FIRMs dated 
from the 1980s.236 Flooding from the storm far exceeded even the 500-year 
flood zones the maps depicted. The city’s mayor at the time, Michael 
Bloomberg, was frank in acknowledging that there was nothing that could be 
done to eliminate the risk entirely, but insisted that homes would be rebuilt 
to make them more resistant to flooding, and called on FEMA to update its 
maps.237 The following year, FEMA released preliminary revised FIRMs, 
with 100-year floodplains that closely tracked areas that had flooded during 
Sandy. The maps would have doubled the number of people living in flood 
zones. 
Six months after the preliminary maps were released, the city filed a 180-
page appeal, arguing that FEMA had overestimated both the base flood 
elevation and the size of the 100-year flood zone.238 FEMA’s proposed maps, 
the city argued, overstated the size of the flood zone by 35%—an area that is 
                                                                                                                                            
 236.  Technically, FEMA had made revisions to these maps, most recently in 2007, but these 
revisions were not based on new technical studies. As FEMA explained, New York City’s FIRMs 
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from the 1980s.” FED. EMERGENCY MGMT. AGENCY, DESIGNING FOR FLOOD LEVELS ABOVE THE 
BFE AFTER HURRICANE SANDY 3 (2013), https://www.fema.gov/media-library-data/
1381405016896-8bdeadf634c366439c35568a588feb24/SandyRA5DesignAboveBFE_508_
FINAL2.pdf [https://perma.cc/UA3G-Z5QX]. FEMA vaguely warned that base flood elevations 
and flood hazard zones based on such old studies “may understate actual flood risk” and suggested 
that people consulting the FIRM verify “[t]he date of the technical studies . . . by reviewing the 
associated FIS [Flood Insurance Study].” Id.  
 237. David W. Chen & Michael M. Grynbaum, Mayor Pledges to Rebuild and Fortify Coast, 
N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 6, 2012), https://nyti.ms/2GtVt3D [https://perma.cc/5Z4F-SZX2]. 
 238. Letter from Daniel A. Zarrilli, Dir., City of N.Y. Mayor’s Office of Recovery & 
Resiliency, to Michael Moriarty, Dir., Mitigation Div. Fed. Emergency Mgmt. Agency Region 2 
(June 26, 2015), https://www1.nyc.gov/assets/floodmaps/images/content/pages/1-NYC%
20FEMA%20Appeal%20FINAL%20with%20Appendices%20and%20Cover%20Letter%20062
52015_web.pdf [https://perma.cc/4CRK-LNSB]. 
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home to 170,000 people.239 In addition to its technical objections, the city 
commissioned the RAND Corporation to study the financial burden the 
proposed maps would have on its residents. The RAND Corporation’s report, 
foreshadowing the nationwide conclusions in FEMA’s own affordability 
analysis,240 found that flood insurance was already too expensive for many 
New Yorkers, and that the new preliminary maps would make the problem 
worse.241 The City of New York and FEMA recently announced that the end 
result of this dispute will be two maps: one that depicts the city’s current 
flood risk for purposes of the NFIP’s rates and purchase mandate, and another 
that depicts future flood risk, for purposes of the City’s planning and 
mitigation efforts.242 Under these circumstances, residents can arguably be 
forgiven for not knowing when or how badly their homes might flood.243 
Of course, this argument should not be taken too far. It is not true that 
nobody has any meaningful sense of the flood risk they face. In many places 
the risk, especially over longer time horizons, is glaringly obvious. Indeed, 
despite its traditional insistence on subjective knowledge, the tort doctrine of 
assumption of risk has long incorporated an obviousness exception, under 
which some risks are so obvious that a plaintiff can be said to have known of 
                                                                                                                                            
 239. Id. 
 240. See generally FED. EMERGENCY MGMT. AGENCY, supra note 236. 
 241.  DIXON ET AL., supra note 224, at xxv. 
 242.  Press Release, Fed. Emergency Mgmt. Agency, Mayor De Blasio and FEMA Announce 
Plan to Revise NYC’s Flood Maps (Oct. 17, 2016), https://www.fema.gov/news-release/2016/10/
17/mayor-de-blasio-and-fema-announce-plan-revise-nycs-flood-maps [https://perma.cc/RQ77-
7CQB]. 
 243. Chen, supra note 219 (“The various maps that the residents have used to determine the 
flood boundaries—whether from FEMA, the Department of City Planning or other sources— 
offer conflicting results about whether a house is in the flood plain, Ms. Roff said. On her own 
block of bungalows, she said, one homeowner pays $5,000 a year in premiums. A few doors 
down, another does not have insurance. Just beyond that, a new homeowner is spending $300,000 
to raise a house 20 feet like ‘a castle in the sky,’ she said, thereby avoiding paying any 
insurance.”). 
 Another theme that is highlighted by New York’s dispute with FEMA is the way local 
governments have in some instances worked to keep their constituents in a state of ignorance 
about their flood risk in the interest of avoiding the pain of higher insurance premiums and other 
effects on the local tax base. Indeed, New York is an outlier in working to develop a forward-
looking map to help its residents understand their flood risk. Perhaps the most notorious example 
is the North Carolina state legislature’s decision, responding to pressure from officials in the Outer 
Banks, to overrule a state scientific panel and set unrealistically low assumptions of future sea-
level rise for purposes of evaluating private development and public infrastructure investments. 
See Isaac Stanley-Becker, Scientists Warned of Rising Sea Levels in North Carolina. Republican 
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them as a matter of law.244 The danger of slipping on ice is a classic 
example,245 as is the danger of diving headfirst into a shallow pool.246 The 
question is whether a risk is so obvious that “it is clear that any person of 
normal intelligence must have understood the danger.”247 
This idea is certainly applicable in the flood context. Sea level rise is 
already changing life in many places in the United States, particularly along 
the East Coast.248 Nobody buying waterfront property in 2019 in Miami, the 
Outer Banks of North Carolina, barrier islands along the Jersey Shore, or any 
number of other high-risk locations could credibly express shock if a 
damaging storm comes along. My aim is not to suggest that all Americans 
are laboring in ignorance of flood risk, but rather to suggest that we should 
not assume, as many too often do, that flood risk is obvious to everyone 
affected by it. 
IV. CHOICE 
Simply understanding one’s risk of flood—hard as that is—is not enough. 
In order to have assumed the risk of flooding one must, armed with the 
requisite knowledge, choose to encounter the risk. Under the pure laissez-
faire conception of assumption of risk that applied in torts cases from the 
early twentieth century, formal choice was all that mattered. Thus Lamson, 
not being enslaved and thus technically free to leave his job for fear of falling 
axes, was said to have assumed any risk of injury by choosing to stay. That 
formalist vision of the nature of choice in a modern economy has long been 
abandoned; we now understand that people make choices about things like 
employment in an economic and social context that constrains their behavior, 
such that merely remaining in a job no longer feels morally significant. This 
Part argues that the choice of where to live is similarly constrained. There are 
                                                                                                                                            
 244. WILLIAM L. PROSSER, TORTS 310 (2d ed. 1955) (“[T]here are certain risks which anyone 
of adult age must be taken to appreciate . . . . [W]here it is clear that any person of normal 
intelligence . . . must have understood the danger, the issue must be decided by the court.”); W. 
PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS § 68, at 488 (5th ed. 1984) 
(“There are some things . . . which are so far a matter of common knowledge in the community, 
that in the absence of some satisfactory explanation a denial of such knowledge simply is not to 
be believed.”). 
 245. PROSSER, supra note 244, at 310.  
 246. See Griebler v. Doughboy Recreational Inc., 466 N.W.2d 897, 901 (Wis. 1991); see also 
O’Sullivan v. Shaw, 726 N.E.2d 951, 956 (Mass. 2000) (collecting cites). 
 247. PROSSER, supra note 2444, at 301; Poole v. Coakley & Williams Constr. Co., Inc., 31 
A.3d 212, 223 (Md. 2011) (distinguishing danger of slipping on visible snow and ice from danger 
of slipping on invisible “black” ice). 
 248. See supra text accompanying notes 67, 179, 189. 
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a host of obstacles—legal, economic, emotional, and cognitive—that act as 
constraints on the choices we make when moving to or remaining in a flood-
prone house. These obstacles mean that for some (but not all), the choice to 
encounter the risk of flood is not much of a choice at all. 
A. The Choice to Remain 
Americans are not as mobile as perhaps they should be, and rates of 
interstate mobility have been declining for decades.249 As different regions 
and metropolitan areas of the country face widely divergent economic 
futures, this lack of mobility has become a problem that has attracted 
enormous attention. To economists, in particular, mobility is the free market 
solution to the problem of declining economic sectors and regions; if median 
wages in West Virginia are a fraction of what they are in New York, then 
clearly there would be gains in welfare (and GDP) if people simply left West 
Virginia in search of the economic opportunities offered by more prosperous 
locales. 
For decades, various efforts aimed at addressing poverty and inequality 
have thus focused on helping move people from one place to another, either 
within a particular city, as in the case of Chicago’s Gautreaux program, or 
nationally, as in the case of the federal Moving to Opportunity program.250 
Social scientists studying the outcomes of these programs have tended to 
conclude that moving to a more prosperous and integrated area can indeed 
have significant positive impacts on a family’s life outcomes.251 Convincing 
people to move (and to stay) has, however, proven to be more difficult. 
Perhaps the most significant factors that dissuade people from moving are 
the ones that are hardest to quantify. The places we live are where we make 
friends and raise families, and moving often means destroying or 
compromising these social networks.252 For many of us, the neighborhoods, 
towns, or cities we call home are deeply ingrained in our self-identities. Many 
people simply love their homes, and express an inability to imagine life 
elsewhere.253 In many flood prone parts of the country, residential housing 
                                                                                                                                            
 249. David Schleicher, Stuck! The Law and Economics of Residential Stagnation, 127 YALE 
L.J. 78, 81–82 (2017).  
 250. Id. at 104–05.  
 251. Id. at 107.  
 252. Id. at 123. 
 253.  One empirical study that examined willingness to relocate among those affected by 
Hurricane Sandy found little relationship between households’ proximity to the ocean (a rough 
proxy for flood risk) and their interest in relocating. The authors speculate that “non-geophysical 
factors, such as household-level confidence in the ability to adapt and continue habitation in such 
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patterns are still shaped by a history of racial discrimination, which often 
forced minority communities into low-lying areas.254 
There are many more quantifiable obstacles to leaving home. For 
homeowners, the overwhelming majority of NFIP policyholders, moving 
typically involves selling a home and buying a new one, which entails 
significant transaction costs. Homeowners whose home equity has been 
reduced or even eliminated by economic downturns—or by a flood—might 
face particular obstacles to leaving.255 There are less obvious financial costs 
to moving too. Thirteen percent of Americans work for state and local 
governments, and 92% of those workers have defined benefit public 
pensions.256 Many of these plans have long vesting periods and other features 
that restrict their beneficiaries’ ability to move.257 The possibility of losing 
access to various public benefits is another disincentive to moving. 
In order to leave a flood-prone home one must have somewhere else to go. 
Along with obstacles to leaving a particular place are obstacles to entering 
another. Land use restrictions have attracted a great deal of negative attention 
recently, as housing prices in certain desirable areas of the country have 
skyrocketed.258 To many, restrictions on development have made large 
contributions to this problem, thereby making it harder for economically 
prosperous regions to attract new workers from underperforming areas.259 
Many of the regions that are attracting new workers are of course also flood-
prone; my point is not that zoning laws keep people from moving to dry areas, 
but rather that they are one of many factors that combine to make the prospect 
of moving out of a flood zone too costly to contemplate. Occupational 
licensing is another barrier to entry worth mentioning. The number of jobs 
that require state licenses has increased dramatically in recent decades,260 
                                                                                                                                            
locations, values, and other qualitative personal factors play a larger role.” Anamaria Bukvic et 
al., The Role of Proximity to Waterfront in Residents’ Relocation Decision-Making Post-
Hurricane Sandy, 154 OCEAN & COASTAL MGMT. 8, 8 (2018). 
 254. See, e.g., Craig E. Colten, Basin Street Blues: Drainage and Environmental Equity in 
New Orleans 1890–1930, 28 J. HIST. GEOGRAPHY 237 (2002).  
 255.  Schleicher, supra note 249, at 128–29. 
 256. Id. at 124. 
 257. Id. (“[E]ighteen states require a teacher to stay in the system for eight or more years 
before she can access her benefits.”). 
 258. Id. at 114–15.  
 259.  One study found that land use restrictions lowered aggregate U.S. growth by 36% from 
1964 to 2009. Chang-Tai Hsieh & Enrico Moretti, Housing Constraints and Spatial Misallocation 
1 (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 21,154, 2015, rev. 2018). Schleicher notes 
that economists have come up with a broad range of estimates of the negative effect of zoning 
laws on GDP. Schleicher, supra note 249, at 103 n.101. 
 260.  Schleicher, supra note 249, at 117 & n.166. To illustrate the surprising breadth of these 
laws, Schleicher offers some examples: “animal breeder[s], auctioneer[s], bartender[s], florist[s], 
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such that roughly 25% of the workforce is now covered by state licensing 
laws—a larger percentage than minimum wage earners or private sector 
union members.261 The burden of acquiring the licenses needed varies 
tremendously, but the broader point is that licensing regimes “create 
substantial barriers to entry for many classes of workers.”262 
B. Notice and the Choice to Arrive 
The decision to move to a flood-prone home is more likely to be a choice 
made under conditions of freedom than the decision to remain in a home one 
already owns. The interaction between knowledge and choice has an 
important temporal quality: if one learns the flood risk associated with a 
property and then decides to move in, the case for having assumed the risk is 
much stronger. 
Unfortunately, there is no federal law requiring that buyers be notified in 
advance of a home’s flood risk. Many states have such laws, although many 
do not. A recent report by the NRDC compiled the laws on flood disclosure 
in all fifty states.263 Twenty-one states have no statutory or regulatory 
requirement that buyers be notified of a home’s flood history.264 Florida, one 
of the country’s epicenters of flood risk, is one such state.265 In many states 
that do have disclosure requirements, the laws are vaguely worded or carry 
weak penalties. New York, for instance, does require that sellers disclose 
whether a property is located in a floodplain, but the statutory penalty for 
failing to make this disclosure is a $500 credit towards the purchase price at 
closing, a punishment so low that, the NRDC reported, many sellers simply 
opt not to say anything.266 Louisiana and Mississippi, on the other hand, both 
                                                                                                                                            
interior designer[s], . . . hair braider[s], and scrap metal recycler[s]” all now require licenses in 
some states. Id. at 118. 
 261. Id. at 118. 
 262. Id. at 120. The effect of these barriers has been observed empirically. For example, 
“barbers and hairdressers are 27% less likely to move between states but only 7% less likely to 
move within state than their peers in other [non-licensed] occupations.” Id. (alteration in original). 
 263. See Joel Scata, Home Buyers Face Stacked Deck to Learn of Past Floods, NAT. 
RESOURCES DEF. COUNCIL: EXPERT BLOG (Aug. 16, 2018), https://www.nrdc.org/experts/joel-
scata/home-buyers-face-stacked-decks-learn-past-floods [https://perma.cc/7CJ3-CX3Y]; see 
also How States Stack Up on Flood Disclosure, NAT. RESOURCES DEF. COUNCIL, 
https://www.nrdc.org/flood-disclosure-map [https://perma.cc/QT4R-7CFK] (last visited Mar. 4, 
2019).  
 264. Scata, supra note 263.  
 265. Id.  
 266. Id.  
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have mandatory, broadly worded disclosure laws.267 To make matters worse, 
federal law prohibits FEMA from releasing claims history on individual 
properties, preventing buyers from finding this information themselves.268 
Of course, there will always be a variety of factors that affect a choice. 
The mere presence of a range of costs supporting the decision to remain in a 
home despite the risk of flood does not necessarily mean that the decision 
was not made freely. The question must be whether the circumstances compel 
a particular choice so strongly that they amount to a form of coercion, such 
that the choice isn’t freely made at all.269 To put the point another way, is the 
alternative course of action real (in the sense of truly available), or illusory? 
This question cannot have one answer for all Americans who live with a risk 
of flooding. After all, some people do choose to leave their flood-prone 
homes.270 My goal here is to show merely that some subset of people truly 
have not chosen to expose themselves to the flood risk they face. 
We are comfortable with the idea that some workers’ “choice” to perform 
dangerous jobs is no choice at all, while for others the choice is meaningful. 
There is a world of difference between the factory worker who knows the risk 
of mangled limbs and remains at the loom and the highly compensated lawyer 
who knows the risk of stress, inadequate sleep, and a career spent sitting down 
and remains at the word processor. So too is there a world of difference 
between the third-generation resident of New Orleans’ Lower Ninth Ward 
                                                                                                                                            
 267. NAT. RESOURCES DEF. COUNCIL, supra note 263.  
 268. See Ehlmann v. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., No. 4:12-CV-1392-RWS, 2013 WL 3724906, 
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CHRON. (Aug. 25, 2018), https://www.houstonchronicle.com/news/houston-weather/
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[https://perma.cc/S39Y-6WCY]. 
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who inherited her home and cannot locate the deed271 and the titan of finance 
who chooses to build on the idyllic barrier island.272 
In attempting to draw a line between those who occupy flood-prone homes 
as a matter of choice and those who do so out of some form of necessity, 
some general observations can be made. First, it seems obvious that there is 
a strong correlation between freedom and wealth. Poverty is inversely 
correlated with mobility,273 and positively correlated with flood risk.274 
Indeed, one study that analyzed the effects of hurricanes on population 
changes in the Gulf Coast found that “advantaged groups” like young white 
people “are more likely to move out of or avoid moving into harm’s way 
while socially vulnerable groups have fewer choices.”275 Our sense of who 
has chosen to bear the risk of flooding should incorporate the idea that the 
less well-off are less likely to have had a meaningful opportunity to choose 
where they live. Importantly, this justification for socializing flood risk is 
distinct from an appeal to pure need. 
Second, there is probably a correlation between housing tenure and the 
freedom of one’s choice to live in a particular place. While this will not be 
true in many cases, it seems likely that those who have lived in one place for 
many decades are less likely to have a meaningful opportunity to leave, 
whether because of strong social or cultural ties, limited means to undertake 
an expensive move, lower transferability of skills, age, or a host of other 
factors. Indeed, in its report on affordability, FEMA noted that its empirical 
findings “support[ed] our extensive anecdotal evidence that there is a 
significant population in the [special flood hazard area] of lower-income 
families who have either inherited their homes or are retirees who are 
particularly sensitive to the financial burden of flood insurance.”276 The 
                                                                                                                                            
 271. See, e.g., Kathy Finn, Blighted Houses Still Mar New Orleans a Decade After Katrina, 
REUTERS (Aug. 23, 2015), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-katrina-blight/blighted-
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converse of both factors is likely to be true as well. Those with plenty to spend 
are more likely to have a meaningful choice of where to live, as are those who 
have moved more recently.277 The NFIP could do more to divide these groups 
of policyholders, subsidizing those who made no choice to encounter a risk 
of flooding and penalizing those who have. 
V. REFORM 
Highlighting the importance of assumption of risk in the moral calculus of 
flood insurance leads to a subtle but important shift in emphasis in avenues 
for reform of the program. One goal of this Article has been to problematize 
the near-universal call for actuarial rates. Many have argued that there may 
be good reasons to subsidize rates for some portion of homeowners on the 
basis of need. In addition to this argument from need, an argument from 
involuntariness should be recognized. Because many homeowners do not 
knowingly choose to accept the risk of flooding they face, they arguably 
should not be made to bear the full actuarial cost of that risk. To return to the 
healthcare analogy, we should think of the costs of flooding as lying 
somewhere between the costs of smoking and the costs of being born female 
and thus subject to a hybrid system, in which insurance premiums are 
structured so that they are neither fully actuarial for everyone always nor so 
totally socialized that they bear no relationship to the quantum of risk each 
policyholder faces.  
On the other hand, many people do understand the risk of flooding and do 
choose to expose themselves to it. My argument is not that everyone currently 
paying subsidized rates should be allowed to continue to do so indefinitely, 
only that imposing actuarial rates is in some cases morally problematic. There 
is also an important feedback loop at work here: actuarial rates are an 
important source of information about the flood risk a property faces and thus 
can create the condition of knowledge that helps justify their imposition. To 
put the point another way, creating an unlimited entitlement to subsidized 
premiums that runs with a property misleads people about the risk they face 
when they move in, and undermines the argument that they knowingly chose 
the risk and thus should not be entitled to pay subsidized rates going forward. 
All of this suggests the need to focus on avenues of reform that get at the 
very heart of why the NFIP has proved to be such a difficult political puzzle. 
                                                                                                                                            
 277. For a particularly glaring example, consider the phenomenon of homeowners in upscale 
communities located on barrier islands who respond to severe storms by building larger homes. 
See Eli D. Lazarus et al., Building Back Bigger in Hurricane Strike Zones, 1 NATURE 
SUSTAINABILITY 759, 759 (2018) (finding that new homes built following hurricanes in five 
coastal communities had on average 55% larger footprints). 
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The major challenge is to reconcile the long-term need to manage our 
individual and collective exposure to flood risk without unfairly imposing 
short-term hardship on people who did not meaningfully choose to encounter 
this risk. There are two roles of government that are here locked in seemingly 
irreconcilable conflict: the obligation to enact rational policy that serves the 
national interest over the long term, on one hand, and the obligation to help 
those among us who are seen to be victims of circumstances beyond their 
control, on the other. At least part of the solution, the focus on assumption of 
risk suggests, lies in improving Americans’ understanding of their risk of 
flooding and creating meaningful options to reduce that risk without in the 
process destroying the home equity of people who did not themselves have 
the benefits of knowledge and choice when they moved in. 
A. Knowledge 
Americans’ knowledge of the flood risk they face is, in general, woeful. 
Improving this knowledge begins with improving and refining the scientific 
understanding of flood risk and how climate change will affect it in the 
coming decades. FEMA should also improve its ability to incorporate the 
latest science into its own risk calculations, which means both incorporating 
new data and models faster than it has done in the past and beginning the 
project of projecting how flood risks will change in the future. Keeping maps 
up to date is another obvious goal. Fortunately, all of these ideas have 
attracted attention, and this work is underway to varying degrees. 
Flood Insurance Rate Maps, however, will always by necessity be highly 
complex and technical documents. With their bewildering array of zones and 
codes and symbols, they resist easy comprehension.278 It is worth thinking 
about abandoning the idea of the FIRM as the primary means of 
communicating flood risk to property owners. The former head of the NFIP 
felt the need to tell Floridians that they should ignore the lines on FEMA’s 
maps and instead just buy flood insurance.279 There should be a way to 
capture that idea in map form. Such a map would ideally eschew bright lines 
and the misleading impression of safety they can create and instead show 
large zones with fuzzy edges giving people a sense that flood risk is 
something that should concern them. FEMA has made some admirable 
strides in this regard, setting up a dedicated, relatively easy to use website 
with zoomable maps instead of the large-file pdfs of yore, but the maps it 
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displays are still FIRMs, and are not designed to create a basic understanding 
of flood risk in the minds of non-experts.280 In 2009, FEMA began a project 
to modernize its maps, and part of that effort included developing “risk 
maps,” simpler, more colorful, less detailed, non-legally binding maps whose 
goal is to help communicate flood risk in a way that is legible to regular 
people.281 However, these maps are not available in many parts of the country 
and are extraordinarily hard to locate on FEMA’s website.282 New York City 
is currently developing two different maps: a FIRM that depicts current flood 
risk in all its complexity, and a forward-looking map designed to guide future 
development and land use decisions.283 
It is also worth looking outside the map entirely. Reading a map is a 
challenge for many people. Maps are also easy to ignore. It was once fairly 
common to mark historical flood depths in a prominent place in small towns 
and cities. In the center of Ellicott City, Maryland, there is a wooden pillar 
supporting a railroad trestle that shows flood depths going back to 1868.284 
On the coast of Japan, hundreds of stone tablets, some more than six hundred 
years old, warn of tsunamis past and future: “Do not build your homes below 
this point!”285 In New Orleans following Hurricane Katrina, a brown line 
marking the height of the standing water that filled much of the city remained 
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File:Ellicott_City_Flood_Stages.jpg [https://perma.cc/FU5H-C3ES] (last updated Mar. 21, 
2012); see also URBAN FLOODING, supra note 205, at 34 (reproducing a photograph of flood depth 
marker in Cedar Rapids, Iowa).  
 285. Martin Fackler, Tsunami Warnings, Written in Stone, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 20, 2011), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2011/04/21/world/asia/21stones.html?smid=pl-share 
[https://perma.cc/YK68-4LM5]. Of course, many of the stones were ignored as development 
boomed following the Second World War. Id.; see also ROBERT MEYER & HOWARD 
KUNREUTHER, THE OSTRICH PARADOX: WHY WE UNDERPREPARE FOR DISASTERS 21–22 (2017) 
(noting that effects of 2011 tsunami in Miyako were worsened by development in defiance of 
stones’ warning). Nevertheless, some towns have heeded the stones’ injunction. In Aneyoshi, a 
tiny village, no development has occurred below the stone; its warning has been supplemented by 
a blue line painted in the road marking the height of the waters. See Fackler, supra. 
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on every building. For years it served as a grim reminder of the water’s depth. 
Although most of it has been cleaned away, there have been efforts to 
publicly mark the depth of the flood.286 This idea could be expanded.287 
Streets in flood zones could be painted blue. We might also consider tangible, 
visible projections of the effects of sea level rise, such as pillars indicating 
the projected water depth in 2100. 
Improving enforcement of the NFIP’s purchase mandate would also 
improve homeowners’ knowledge of the risk they face. Flood insurance 
premiums set at actuarial rates have long been recognized as important 
signals.288 In addition to undermining the financial viability of the program, 
underenforcement of the purchase mandate deprives homeowners of the 
important signal that being required to purchase flood insurance sends. Even 
when homeowners pay subsidized rates, they should be informed of what 
their rates would be if they reflected the full measure of the risk they face. 
Finally, a federal, mandatory notice requirement that applies to any real 
estate transaction would do much to improve the state of knowledge when 
people move. This idea is beginning to gain traction, as criticism has been 
levelled at the current patchwork of state laws (some better than others) that 
govern disclosure of flood risk.289 In Congress, several of the most recent 
proposals for reform of the NFIP have included notice provisions.290 Helping 
prospective homeowners understand the risk at the moment they choose 
whether to take it on could be enormously powerful. 
                                                                                                                                            
 286. Two artists have painted telephone poles blue up to the depth of standing water along a 
major boulevard. Doug McCash, Art Critic Doug McCash’s Guide to 19 Pieces of Outdoor New 
Orleans Art, TIMES-PICAYUNE, http://blog.nola.com/dougmaccash/2009/04/art_critic_doug_
maccash_rates_15.html [https://perma.cc/FF44-HM8W] (last updated Apr. 8, 2009). 
 287. URBAN FLOODING, supra note 205, at 34 (“Use of high-water mark signs [ ]  that identify 
the height of historical floods can also alert residents to their risks and lead them to possible 
mitigation methods.”).  
 288. See Scales, supra note 13, at 44.  
 289. See supra notes 263–67 and accompanying text.  
 290. Flood Insurance Affordability and Sustainability Act of 2017, S. 1313, 115th Cong. 
§ 203 (directing FEMA to promulgate regulations “for the disclosure of flood risk hazards with 
respect to any residential or commercial property that is offered for sale”); 21st Century Flood 
Insurance Reform Act, H.R. 2874, 115th Cong. § 109(a)–(b) (passed by House, Nov. 14, 2017) 
(requiring state and local governments to impose “a duty on any seller or lessor of improved real 
estate located [in a flood zone] to provide to any purchaser or lessee of such property a property 
flood hazard disclosure”).  
51:0163] ASSUMPTION OF FLOOD RISK 221 
 
B. Choice 
Much could also be done to empower homeowners to choose to expose 
themselves to the risk of flood—or to avoid it. One fruitful target of reform 
is FEMA’s buyout program. Participation in purely voluntary buyout 
programs has typically been regarded as disappointing.291 To many who study 
the issue, there are various ways in which buyouts could be made more 
appealing.292 Streamlining the process of being bought out would make the 
prospect more palatable, as would creating a national, freestanding program 
of unlimited duration rather than the patchwork federal/state partnerships that 
currently spring up after major storms and die out several years later.293 
Another related option is to explore large-scale buyouts of entire 
neighborhoods or towns rather than piecemeal buyouts of whoever is willing 
to leave. This approach has the benefit of avoiding the “jack-o-lantern” effect 
of leaving expensive, unattractive gaps in a community as its population 
declines, shouldering local governments with expensive infrastructure to 
maintain and less tax base with which to do it.294 There have been a few 
scattered successes relocating entire communities, but they have all been 
small and rural and therefore enjoyed access to nearby sites to which they 
could be moved.295 In recent years, many have also been Native American 
communities with tribal governments.296 Whether this approach is workable 
in more densely populated areas is an open question. So far, the use of 
eminent domain to force holdouts away from flood zones is a political non-
starter. 
                                                                                                                                            
 291. See Christopher Flavelle, A New Strategy for Climate Change? Retreat, BLOOMBERG, 
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C. The Effect of Assumption 
There are also ways in which the assumption of risk idea could be 
incorporated more strongly into the rate structure of the NFIP. Currently, 
many homeowners living in homes that predate the issuance of a FIRM are 
entitled to subsidized rates, regardless of when they moved in. This approach 
may have made sense from the perspective of assumption of risk when it was 
first implemented, but it is harder to justify today. If an old house is sold to a 
new buyer who makes a free choice to live there with full knowledge of the 
risk it faces, it is hard to see why the age of the house should matter. The 
assumption of risk principle suggests that entitlement to actuarial rates should 
turn on conditions having to do with an individual person’s choices, not the 
physical characteristics of the home they live in. A focus on assumption of 
risk thus supports the idea that subsidized rates should be phased out when 
properties change hands. 
Biggert-Waters contained a provision eliminating subsidized rates for new 
homebuyers and new policyholders.297 Unfortunately, this provision was 
repealed.298 The problem, as Congress quickly learned from many outraged 
constituents, is that while this change may not have had any effect on the 
rates current homeowners were obligated to pay, it did affect the purchase 
price their homes could command, and thus their home equity.299 One way of 
forcing new homebuyers to assume more of the risk of flooding without 
penalizing current homeowners would be to buy out whatever portion of the 
owner’s equity would be destroyed by increasing their flood insurance 
premiums, although this is sure to be expensive and controversial. An easier 
approach, and one that has attracted some interest from Congress, is to phase 
out subsidized rates gradually, with increases capped at, say, 10% per year, 
apparently on the theory that the economic pain will be much easier to 
manage if it is inflicted slowly.300 
                                                                                                                                            
 297. Biggert-Waters Flood Insurance Reform Act of 2012, Pub. L. No. 112-141, 
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The fact of being flooded arguably has a significant impact on an owner’s 
knowledge of the risk she faces, and it could also be made to have a more 
significant impact on flood insurance premiums.301 The NFIP currently 
requires that an old home be elevated above base flood elevation if it is more 
than 50% damaged in a flood. This threshold could be reduced, so that any 
amount of flood damage leading to an insurance claim destroys the home’s 
entitlement to subsidized rates going forward. Of course, the 50% damage 
threshold also points to the importance of choice: a home that is “substantially 
damaged,” to use FEMA’s term, is in a sense a blank slate. At the very least 
the focus on assumption of risk supports maintaining this requirement. 
Finally, the NFIP might consider treating coastal areas differently from 
inland areas. The long-term risk of flooding for those living on the beach is 
certainly much more obvious, and more serious, than for those living 
elsewhere. The NFIP currently does not account for the future risk of sea 
level rise in any way. That should certainly change at least as to the creation 
of flood maps and the understanding of flood risk that goes into the 
calculation of actuarial rates. In the fall of 2017 the House of Representatives 
passed an NFIP reform bill—never taken up by the Senate—that, among 
other things, directed FEMA to consider explicitly the difference between the 
risks faced by coastal and inland properties in setting rates.302 That difference 
might also be made to affect entitlement to subsidized rates, or even 
entitlement to participate in the NFIP at all. There may be communities 
whose prospects, even in the relatively near term, are so dim that they should 
be regarded as uninsurable. 
CONCLUSION 
 
Reform of the National Flood Insurance Program is a crucially important 
part of the work needed to prepare the United States for a near future in which 
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flooding becomes more common and costly than it already is. And yet 
changing the NFIP’s rate structure so that all policyholders pay fully actuarial 
rates—the near-universal recommendation of policy experts, academics, and 
pundits—has proved to be excruciatingly difficult. In part this is because 
many homeowners did not knowingly choose to encounter the risk they face, 
making it morally problematic to saddle them with its full cost. Focusing on 
issues of knowledge and choice in flood risk highlights the need to improve 
these aspects of our approach to the problem. FEMA should do more to help 
individuals understand the risk they face, and to offer them buyouts if they 
do not like what they learn. Ultimately, the goal must be to transition away 
from subsidized premiums in a way that is morally, and therefore politically, 
palatable. 
